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I. INTRODUCTION

For years prior to the decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, 1 commentators had
speculated that the Supreme Court would eventually reverse course on the
principle of agency deference.2 Yet in Kisor the Court elected not to
overturn two earlier decisions that directed courts to defer to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous rule. 3 How did the Court
come to a decision that seemed to go against all expectations? Answering
this question ultimately reveals the following: the decision in Kisor
represents a striking illustration of the law of unintended consequences at
work—a principle often referred to as the cobra effect. 4
Any affirmative action to resolve a problem that results in making
the problem worse is said to illustrate the cobra effect. 5 The phrase has its
roots in colonial India; it was coined after the British government put a
bounty on dead cobras in order to rid the capital city of its growing snake
problem. In response, the citizens of Delhi began breeding cobras to earn
the reward and released them after the government scrapped the offer.

1. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
2. See Standard of Review—Deference to Administrative Agencies, 34 No. 8 FED. LITIGATOR
(Thomson Reuters, Toronto, Ont., Can., Aug. 2019), at NL 7 (“[T]wo flavors of judicial deference to
agency interpretations—Auer deference for agency interpretations of the agency’s regulations and
Chevron deference for agency interpretations of the statutes directing the agency to develop
regulations—have drawn substantial criticism in recent years, with calls for both to be overturned.”).
3. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2424.
4. Stevie Borrello, The Cobra Effect, QUARTZ WEEKLY OBSESSION (Oct. 11, 2019),
https://qz.com/emails/quartz-obsession/1726565/ [https://perma.cc/T7N4-R6YC].
5. See, e.g., Antony Davies & James R. Harrigan, The Cobra Effect: Lessons in Unintended
Consequences, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Sept. 6, 2019), https://fee.org/articles/the-cobra-effectlessons-in-unintended-consequences/ [https://perma.cc/32ZM-2PRX]. The term “cobra effect” was
likely first introduced to describe this phenomenon by German economist Horst Siebert in his book,
Der Kobra-Effekt. See generally HORST SIEBERT, DER KOBRA-EFFEKT: WIE MAN IRRWEGE DER
WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK VERMEIDET (2001); Stephen J. Dunbar, The Cobra Effect, Freakonomics (Oct.
11, 2012, 9:28 AM), https://freakonomics.com/podcast/the-cobra-effect-a-new-freakonomics-radiopodcast/ [https://perma.cc/MZF5-XGSW] (describing “the Cobra Effect” as “a term popularized by
the late German economist Horst Siebert”); Borrello, supra note 4 (explaining that the Cobra Effect
was “[c]oined by German economist Horst Siebert in his 2001 book of the same name . . . .”).
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This left the city with more cobras than existed before the bounty. 6 And
so it was with the Kisor decision: the unintended consequence of Chief
Justice John Roberts’s well-meaning efforts to protect the Court’s
institutional reputation.
Courts have accorded deference to agency interpretations of statutes
and regulations for decades, following the 1945 decision in Bowles v.
Seminole Rock 7 and 35 years later with Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. 8 The two principles of deference are
markedly different. Under Chevron, “a court must give effect to an
agency’s . . . reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute,” 9 while
Seminole Rock deference requires the court to defer to “an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation.” 10 The Supreme Court reaffirmed and
expanded Seminole Rock in 1997 in Auer v. Robbins, 11 and the principle
of deference it established has been referred to as “Auer deference” ever
since. 12
In the years following Auer, the Court has given every indication that
time was running out on agency deference, particularly Auer deference. 13
Conservative members of the Court, such as Justices Scalia and Thomas,
have been particularly critical of all forms of agency deference in the last

6.

This story is available from multiple sources. See, e.g., LESLIE H. BRICKMAN, PREPARING
Davies & Harrigan, supra note 5; Shawn Langlois, The
“Cobra Effect” Will Have a “Disastrous and Unimaginable” Impact on the Market, Wall Street Vet
Warns, MARKETWATCH (July 25, 2020, 8:10 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-cobraeffect-will-have-a-disastrous-and-unimaginable-impact-on-the-market-wall-street-vet-warns-202007-22 [https://perma.cc/S54G-5W8X].
7. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
8. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2000).
10. Id. at 588.
11. See generally Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr. &
Elizabeth H. Slattery, The World After Seminole Rock and Auer, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 625,
635 (2019) (“The Court not only reaffirmed Seminole Rock in 1997 in Auer v. Robbins, but also
applied the deference rule well beyond the original limited context of Seminole Rock.”).
12. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2411 (2019) (“Before the doctrine was called Auer
deference, it was called Seminole Rock deference . . . .”).
13. See Standard of Review – Deference to Administrative Agencies, supra note 2; Adam
Liptak, Limiting Agency Power, a Goal of the Right, Gets Supreme Court Test, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/us/politics/supreme-court-agency-power.html
[https://perma.cc/4N4D-AXFQ] (explaining that Seminole Rock and Auer “have been the subject of
much criticism, and several justices have urged the Supreme Court to revisit them”); Christopher
Walker, Judge Kavanaugh on Administrative Law and Separation of Powers, SCOTUSBLOG (July
26, 2018, 2:55 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/kavanaugh-on-administrative-law-andseparation-of-powers/ [https://perma.cc/R7MX-FXH2] (“In recent years, there has been a growing
call (mainly from those right-of-center) to eliminate — or at least narrow — administrative law’s
judicial-deference doctrines regarding federal agency interpretations of law.”).
THE 21ST CENTURY CHURCH 326–27 (2002);
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twenty years. 14 This attitude among the justices reflects the perspective of
the conservative legal community at large that administrative agencies
have too much power. 15 Justice Scalia, who originally penned the opinion
in Auer, would eventually become one of its harshest critics.16 While
continuing to endorse Chevron deference to the end, over time Scalia’s
support became “more nuanced and laced with express concern.” 17 He
argued that it was inappropriate for the courts to abdicate to an agency the
judiciary’s authority of interpretation, leaving this function to an
executive branch agency and thereby raising separation-of-powers
concerns. 18 Justice Thomas went further, referring to Auer deference as
“unconstitutional,” 19 while Justice Kavanaugh indicated his distaste for
Auer even before joining the Court in 2018. 20 Meanwhile, Justice

14. See Robert V. Percival, Despite Attacks on Judicial Deference, Reports of Auer’s Demise
are Premature, 48 No. 4 TRENDS (A.B.A. Sec. of Env’t, Energy and Resources, Chi., Ill.),
March/April, 2017, at 5–6 (“The late Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas,
campaigned against a . . . form of judicial deference known as Seminole Rock or Auer
deference . . . .”).
15. See generally Elizabeth Slattery, Who Will Regulate the Regulators? 3 (Heritage Found.,
Legal Memorandum No. 153, May 7, 2015), https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/who-willregulate-the-regulators-administrative-agencies-the-separation-powers-and [https://perma.cc/2K9YPMRA] (describing the expansive role of administrative agencies, and the “massive amounts of
power” they wield, “with little oversight,” as amounting to “precisely the accumulation of power that
Madison feared”); see also Nicholas Bagley, ‘Most of Government is Unconstitutional’, N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/opinion/sunday/gundy-united-states.html
[https://perma.cc/7GRZ-PG89] (“[P]owerful agencies have long generated anxiety among
conservatives.”).
16. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 110 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(explaining that Auer deference gives agencies too much power, giving them an “exemption from
notice-and-comment rulemaking”); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617 (2013) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part) (asserting, in answer to the respondent’s request that the Court reconsider Auer,
“I believe that it is time to do so”).
17. David Tarrien, The Legacy of Justice Scalia: Liberal Lion? An Examination of Chevron
Deference, Net Neutrality, and Possible Outcomes of a Supreme Court Decision on the Federal
Communication Commission’s Open Internet Order, 17 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 233, 245 (2016).
18. Decker, 568 U.S. at 621 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (explaining that any efficiency
benefit derived from Auer deference “cannot justify a rule that . . . contravenes one of the great rules
of separate of powers: He who writes the law must not adjudge its violation.”).
19. Perez, 575 U.S. at 112 (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing concern that Auer deference,
by allowing agencies to interpret their own rules, “effects a transfer of the judicial power to an
executive agency [that] raises constitutional concerns”).
20. See The C. Boyden Gray Center, Keynote Address: Justice Scalia and Deference, VIMEO
at 18:33 (June 2, 2016), https://vimeo.com/169758593 [https://perma.cc/BC35-SY3J] (Hon. Brett
Kavanaugh, D.C. Cir., describing Justice Scalia’s view that Auer deference was “a dangerous
permission slip for the arrogation of power” and explaining that there are “huge practical
consequences for individual liberty when the law writer is also the law interpreter”).
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Gorsuch, though not addressing Auer directly, has expressed opposition
to agency deference in the form of Chevron deference. 21
Chief Justice John Roberts was perhaps the most reserved among the
conservative wing of the Court in his criticism of agency deference.22 Yet,
in a 2013 concurring opinion, he too suggested that Auer and Seminole
Rock warranted review. 23 The Court, he wrote, “is now aware that there is
some interest in reconsidering those cases.” 24 More to the point, he
suggested that Auer deference faced an uncertain future, asserting that “it
may be appropriate to reconsider that principle in an appropriate case.” 25
That “appropriate case” arguably came in 2019 in the form of Kisor.
But the Court in Kisor left Auer deference intact, while significantly
restricting its applicability. 26 Technically, Kisor was a unanimous
decision, with all nine justices agreeing that the case should be sent down
to the lower court for reconsideration. 27 But the justices split five to four
on the reasoning, with the majority holding that a court’s deference to an
agency’s interpretation under Auer was warranted only after “exhaust[ing]
all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.” 28
Beyond the principle of agency deference, there was much more at
stake in Kisor. First, there was the principle of stare decisis. Had the Court
overturned Auer (and Seminole Rock with it), Kisor would have
represented the fourth case in its last two terms in which the Court
overturned well-settled law. 29 Writing for the majority in Kisor, Justice
Kagan asserted that stare decisis was a significant hurdle to overturning
Auer. 30 Doing so, she argued, would require the Court “to overrule not a

21. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1158 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that without the principle of Chevron deference, “courts would then fulfill
their duty to exercise their independent judgment about what the law is”).
22. See Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody, Justice Kavanaugh, Lorenzo v. SEC, and the
Post-Kennedy Supreme Court, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 193, 247 (2019) (describing Chief Justice Roberts
as a member of a “soft anti-Chevron camp”: those justices who express their opinions opposing
Chevron deference with a “soft” voice, in contrast with the others, such as Justice Scalia, who argued
against Chevron deference with a “loud” voice).
23. Decker, 568 U.S. at 615–16 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
24. Id. at 616.
25. Id. at 615.
26. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019).
27. Id. at 2407. See also id. at 2423 (“[T]he Federal Circuit jumped the gun in declaring the
regulation ambiguous . . . .”).
28. Id. at 2415.
29. See Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019); Franchise Tax Bd.
of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019); Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council
31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
30. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418.
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single case, but a ‘long line of precedents’—each one reaffirming the rest
and going back 75 years or more.” 31
For all the disdain several justices had previously expressed for Auer
deference, as well as Chevron deference, the attention paid to stare decisis
in Kisor reflected a second, perhaps more fundamental issue at stake: the
reputation, credibility, and legitimacy of the Court as an institution.
Evidence shows increased scrutiny of the Court in the few years leading
up to Kisor, 32 while public approval of the Court had been declining. 33
Disagreements among the justices, even highly contentious ones, are
nothing new. But events outside the Court put the Court and its
proceedings in a political context that may have adversely affected public
perceptions of the Court’s institutional legitimacy. 34 Two obvious
examples include the 2016 fight between the Republican Congress and
President Obama over Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland, and the
highly divisive confirmation hearings of Justice Kavanaugh in 2018,
complete with allegations of sexual misconduct and political
malfeasance. 35
The Kisor decision also draws attention to the ability of the Chief
Justice to impact the Court’s proceedings and influence its reputation. It
is the Chief Justice, after all, who has traditionally borne the ultimate
responsibility for managing and cultivating the integrity of the Supreme
Court in historical, institutional, and even political contexts.36 Chief
Justice Roberts is no exception, expressing on numerous occasions his
concern for the Court’s reputation and a willingness to act for its
31.
32.

Id. at 2422.
Henry Gass, John Roberts’s Mission Impossible for the Supreme Court, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2016/1116/John-Roberts-smission-impossible-for-the-Supreme-Court [https://perma.cc/XL42-UWDZ].
33. In Depth: Topics A to Z, Supreme Court, GALLUP NEWS, https://news.gallup.com/
poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx [https://perma.cc/URG4-8YJR]. (The question asked was, “Do you
approve or disapprove of the way the Supreme Court is handling its job?”).
34. See Eric Hamilton, Politicizing the Supreme Court, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36
(2012).
35. Michael Tomasky, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/opinion/supreme-courts-legitimacy-crisis.html
[https://perma.cc/XZ7T-M2B8] (referring to the Senate’s failure to vote on the nomination of Judge
Merrick Garland as “breaking the rules;” the fact that Justice Gorsuch was the first justice nominated
by a president who had not won the popular vote; that Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation was marred
by allegations of sexual misconduct; and multiple justices have now been confirmed by legislators
representing minority support).
36. Benjamin Pomerance, Center of Order: Chief Justice John Roberts and the Coming
Struggle for a Respected Supreme Court, 82 ALB. L. REV. 449, 463–64 (2019) (explaining the role of
the Chief Justice as “a kind of gatekeeper of the institution’s reputation”). See also Peter G. Fish, The
Office of the Chief Justice of the United States, in THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE 59 (1984)
(“Chiefs have long sought to protect the status and political independence of their Court.”).
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preservation. 37 For example, Roberts has taken the unusual step of directly
responding to external criticism directed at the Court. For example, he has
responded to sharp comments from both President Obama 38 and President
Trump 39 on separate occasions. Roberts also appears to be willing to put
aside his inclinations in particular cases, voting with the more liberal
justices to steer the Court into calmer waters. 40
Understood in this context, the opinion in Kisor may not be entirely
surprising after all. In fact, it is perhaps entirely unsurprising that the
decisive fifth vote in Kisor—the vote that kept Auer intact—came from
Roberts, joining his more liberal colleagues.41 The Kisor result
represented a win for stare decisis. But the decision ultimately did not
represent a victory for the Court (or the lower courts, for that matter), as
the version of Auer deference left behind following Kisor is weak, perhaps
even untenable. 42
Thus, Kisor ultimately represents a high-stakes example of the cobra
effect. By leaving Auer intact, but in a weakened state, the Court—and
Roberts specifically—likely did more harm than good to the Court’s
institutional reputation. Stability in the law comes not just from reliance
on precedent. It comes from providing clear, decisive direction to the
lower courts. It springs from overturning bad law. And it arises from the
Court’s steadfast authority over the interpretation of the law. The outcome
in Kisor may have also weakened all of these.

37. See JOAN BISKUPIC, THE CHIEF 9 (2019) (“Roberts understood that public regard was
crucial to the Supreme Court’s stature in American life. He had studied the reputations of past Chief
Justices . . . .”).
38. David G. Savage, Chief Justice Unsettled by Obama’s Criticism of Supreme Court, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2010), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-mar-10-la-na-robertsspeech10-2010mar10-story.html [https://perma.cc/C2T4-7BTE].
39. Robert Barnes, Rebuking Trump’s Criticism of ‘Obama Judge,’ Chief Justice Roberts
Defends Judiciary as ‘Independent.’ WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/rebuking-trumps-criticism-of-obama-judge-chief-justice-roberts-defends-judiciary-asindependent/2018/11/21/6383c7b2-edb7-11e8-96d4-0d23f2aaad09_story.html?noredirect=on
[https://perma.cc/4R3G-XR93].
40. BISKUPIC, supra note 37, at 10 (“Yet Roberts has at times set aside his ideological and
political interests on behalf of his commitments to the Court’s institutional reputation and his own
public image.”).
41. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Limits Agency Power, a Goal of the Right, N.Y. TIMES (June
26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/us/politics/supreme-court-agency-power.html
[https://perma.cc/7WCS-KNTP] (“[T]he justices [in Kisor] largely split 5 to 4 on the reasoning, with
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. joining the court’s four-member liberal wing to cast the decisive
vote to retain the precedents.”).
42. See, e.g., Eric S. Schmitt, Symposium: Kisor v. Wilkie – A Swing and a Miss,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2019, 12:46 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/symposium-kisorv-wilkie-a-swing-and-a-miss/ [https://perma.cc/G3GC-JX76].
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The following note will address these issues in three parts. First, Part
II will provide a background of Kisor in the context of Auer deference,
with a closer look at why the Court was inclined to overturn Auer. Part III
will provide a review of the recent cases in which the Court overturned
precedents. This will include a discussion of the importance of stare
decisis as a basic self-governing principle within the judicial branch. 43
Further, Part III will then explore evidence of Roberts’s perspective on
stare decisis, the Court’s reputation, and the role of the Chief Justice.
Finally, Part IV will present an analysis of why the Court ought to
overturn Auer, clearly and decisively, at the next opportunity. It should do
so both because it is the correct move jurisprudentially and because doing
so will ultimately serve the Court’s institutional reputation more than
deference to stare decisis would.
II. BACKGROUND: THE RISE AND ANTICIPATED
FALL OF AUER DEFERENCE
A.

Agency deference

Courts interpret the law. In doing so, judges often look to a variety
of sources to aid them in determining the most proper reading of the
Constitution, statute, ordinance, regulation, or contract―all of which can
often be ambiguous or vague. 44 The federal agency responsible for the
administration of a given statute or regulation has served as one such
source for federal courts since 1944, with the holding in Skidmore v. Swift
& Co. 45 Since Skidmore, in the face of unyielding ambiguity in the text of
laws in different cases, the Supreme Court has called for varying levels of
deference to the views of the relevant administrative agencies. Three
doctrines of agency deference commonly invoked by the courts are
relevant to the issue at stake here. They are Skidmore deference, Chevron
deference, and Seminole Rock deference, which later became Auer
deference. 46 This subsection will proceed to review each.
43. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888).
44. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2410 (2019) (“Begin with a familiar problem in
administrative law: For various reasons, regulations may be genuinely ambiguous.”).
45. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
46. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1099 (2008) (explaining that “the Court’s deference practice functions along a continuum,” and
describing Skidmore deference as falling on the less deferential end, with Chevron deference and
Seminole Rock deference at the more deferential end of that continuum). See also Andrew Hessick,
The Future of Administrative Deference, 41 CAMPBELL L. REV. 421, 422 (2019) (explaining that with
Chevron and Auer, “courts have two doctrines of binding deference,” while under Skidmore deference
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1. Skidmore Deference
Skidmore was one of many labor-related cases to come to the Court
in the wake of New Deal legislation of the late 1930s, which also saw the
growth of administrative agencies. 47 In Skidmore, employees of a
meatpacking plant sued for overtime wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA” or “the Act”). At issue was the
interpretation of the term “working time” within the overtime provisions
of the Act. The employees worked in the fire hall at the company’s plant.
In this role, they worked 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., Monday through Friday,
but also spent up to four nights each week “on call” (either on-premise or
“within hailing distance”) to answer alarms. The question was whether the
time spent “on call” was “working time” under the Act such that those
hours would count toward the employees’ overtime calculations. 48
In deriving its interpretation of “working time,” the Court relied in
part on the views of the FLSA Administrator.49 The Administrator had
addressed this very issue in an edition of an interpretative bulletin he
occasionally published to serve as a guide to employers and employees on
how the agency would apply the law in different circumstances. The Court
noted that the Administrator’s conclusions were not authoritative, but
were “entitled to respect.” 50
On the one hand, the Skidmore Court recognized that the
Administrator’s findings “are not reached as a result of hearing adversary
proceedings in which he finds facts from evidence and reaches
conclusions of law from findings of fact.” 51 As such, the Administrator is
not fulfilling a truly judicial role, and so the conclusions he draws are not
conclusive and binding on a district court “as an authoritative
pronouncement of a higher court might [be].” 52 At the same time, the
Court also recognized that the Administrator’s representations and
applications of the Act reflect his efforts in his official duties, with the
benefit of more “specialized experience, broader investigations and
information” than a judge would have. 53 Ultimately, the Court held that
“agency interpretations of the statutes they administer and of the regulations they promulgate are
entitled to great weight—but they are not binding”).
47. See RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT IN A SEPARATION OF POWERS
SYSTEM 111 (2015) (describing Skidmore as “[t]he first important New Deal era standard” that played
a “fundamental role of the administrative state”).
48. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135–36.
49. Id. at 137–38.
50. Id. at 140.
51. Id. at 139.
52. Id. at 139.
53. Id.
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“[t]he fact that the Administrator’s policies and standards are not reached
by trial in adversary form does not mean that they are not entitled to
respect.” 54 In other words, deference is due to the Administrator’s
interpretation as input to the judge’s ultimate interpretive role.
With this, the Court established a new rule of law that would be
known as Skidmore deference. Under this doctrine, federal courts are to
give an appropriate level of deference to an agency’s interpretation of a
statute it administers, as one of many sources of interpretation reflecting
“a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance.” 55 Under Skidmore, the
agency’s interpretation is persuasive, not controlling on courts. The
Skidmore Court further stated that the level of deference afforded the
agency would depend on a variety of factors that reflect the soundness of
the agency’s reasoning. 56
2. Chevron Deference
The Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 57 established the principle of
Chevron deference. Under the doctrine of Chevron deference, federal
courts must defer to a federal agency’s construction of a statute the agency
administers when the statutory language is ambiguous, so long as the
agency’s interpretation is based upon a “permissible construction of the
statute.” 58 In Chevron, the Natural Resource Defense Council challenged
an EPA regulation that the agency had issued in 1981 for purposes of
implementing the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act. One provision
of the regulation, which addressed “stationary sources” of air pollution,
included a definition of “stationary source” that would allow states to treat
all pollution sources within an industrial group as one source. 59 The Court
54. Id. at 139–40.
55. Id. at 140.
56. Id. (“The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade . . . .”). Descriptions of how
Skidmore deference is to be applied have been provided by the Court in more recent cases as well.
See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (explaining that agency
interpretations are “entitled to respect . . . but only to the extent that those interpretations have the
power to persuade” (internal punctuation removed)); Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2009)
(describing the level of deference to afford an agency’s interpretation as based upon a “sliding scale”).
57. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
58. Id. at 843.
59. Under the 1977 amendments to the Act, states that have not met the agency’s air quality
standards had to meet certain requirements. One of these requirements was the establishment of a
permit program regulating “new or modified major stationary sources” of air pollution within the
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of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit set aside the agency’s regulation, and the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the EPA’s interpretation of
stationary source was permissible. 60 Consistent with the Court’s view as
expressed in Skidmore, the Court here explained that such deference to
the agency’s interpretation was appropriate because “[j]udges are not
experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the
Government.” 61
3. Seminole Rock or Auer Deference
Just a year after Skidmore, the Court decided Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., which expanded on Skidmore in two critical ways. 62
First, unlike Skidmore or Chevron, the principle of Seminole Rock
deference (and Auer deference with it) applies in cases where an agency
regulation, rather than a statute, is at issue. 63 Second, Seminole Rock
directed courts to yield to the agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous
rule, such that the agency’s interpretation is authoritative, not merely
persuasive. Only when the agency’s interpretation is “plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation” should the court not give it
“controlling weight.” 64
Auer deference arose following the case of Auer v. Robbins in
1997. 65 It is not so much a stand-alone form of agency deference as a
rebranded form of Seminole Rock deference.66 As with a Chevron
analysis, courts applying Auer must first determine whether the agency
state. For such stationary sources, a permit was to be issued only if the entity seeking the permit met
specific, strict conditions. But by defining “stationary source” as it did in the ensuing 1981 regulation,
states would be able to treat all pollution control devices in a single plant as if they were encased in a
“bubble.” A company could thus install or modify equipment in a plant without meeting the new
source requirements, so long as doing so did not increase the total emissions from the plant as a whole.
This gave businesses the flexibility to meet the requirements by offsetting increased emissions from
one building by reducing them elsewhere within the same plant. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837, 840–41.
See also Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 14, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/chevron-usa-v-natural-res-def-council [https://perma.cc/UT3R-MP76].
60. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
61. Id. at 865.
62. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
63. See Conor Clarke, The Uneasy Case Against Auer and Seminole Rock, 33 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 175, 175 (describing Chevron deference as applying “when Congress leaves an
ambiguous gap in a piece of legislation,” and Auer deference as that which “applies to agencies’
interpretations of their own regulations”) (emphasis removed).
64. Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414, 417–18.
65. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
66. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2411 (2019) (“For the past 20 or so years, we have
referred to that doctrine as Auer deference . . . . But the name is something of a misnomer. Before the
doctrine was called Auer deference, it was called Seminole Rock deference.”).
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rule is clear or ambiguous. 67 As Auer deference stood prior to the Kisor
decision, if a court determined that a regulation was ambiguous, the
agency’s interpretation was binding as long as it was reasonable. 68 While
Auer is perhaps less familiar than Chevron, it is no less significant. As
Chief Justice Roberts has alluded, Auer goes “to the heart of
administrative law,” and applications of the doctrine “arise as a matter of
course on a regular basis.” 69
In Auer, the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners denied
overtime pay to a group of the city’s police sergeants, under an exemption
in the FLSA. The Secretary of Labor filed an amicus brief in which he
provided an interpretation of the statutory exemption. 70 The Court held,
consistent with Seminole Rock, that an interpretation of the statutory
exemption provided by the Secretary of Labor, whose department
administered the FLSA, was “a creature of the Secretary’s own
regulations,” and thus “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.’” 71
The very notion of deference in the context of a court decision is
significant. Black’s Law Dictionary defines deference as “showing
respect for somebody or something” and “a polite or respectful attitude.”72
This definition may accurately describe Skidmore deference, 73 but both
Chevron and Auer deference may be better described as the courts bowing
to the authority of another branch of government. 74 That courts relinquish
power to another branch is likely one reason why agency deference has
been described as “quite possibly the single most important concept in all

67. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414 (describing how under Auer, “the possibility of deference can
arise only if a regulation is genuinely ambiguous”). See also Clarke, supra note 63, at 190 (“[B]efore
the Court asks whether the agency’s interpretation is plainly erroneous, it asks whether the regulation
in question is actually ambiguous.”).
68. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
69. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
70. Auer, 519 U.S. at 454‒55.
71. Id. at 461 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
72. Deference, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
73. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that the “rulings,
interpretations and opinions” of the agency have the “power to persuade, if lacking power to control”).
74. Generally, with either Chevron or Auer deference, the court is to give an administrative
agency’s reasonable interpretation controlling weight. See Stephen M. DeGenaro, Note, Why Should
We Care About an Agency’s Special Insight? 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 909 (2013) (explaining
that under Chevron “an agency’s permissible construction of an ambiguous statute is to be given
controlling weight” and “the Supreme Court’s holding in . . . Seminole Rock . . . gave controlling
weight to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation”) (internal quotations
omitted).
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of legal thought.” 75 But while the agency’s interpretation is given
controlling weight under both Auer and Chevron, these are not equivalent
forms of deference, and the difference is significant. With Auer deference,
“an agency serves as both the drafter and the interpreter of ambiguous
regulations,” which empowers the agency to make the law and then
control its interpretation, potentially undermining the authority of both
Congress and the courts. 76
B.

Kisor: the petitioner asked the Court to overturn Auer

In Kisor v. Wilkie, a Vietnam War veteran seeking retroactive
disability benefits urged the Court to overturn Auer, and many observers
seemed sure it would do so. 77 Instead, the Court upheld Auer but tightened
the reins on its application by the courts. 78
James Kisor was a retired U.S. Marine whom the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) had denied disability benefits dating back to
1982. 79 The VA reopened his case in 2006, at which time the department
granted his benefits, but only from that date, not retroactively. An appeals
board agreed with the decision, based on its interpretation of the agency
rule governing such claims. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
affirmed the board’s decision. Applying Auer deference, the Federal
Circuit also affirmed, concluding that the VA regulation was ambiguous,
so the Board’s interpretation was controlling. 80
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the specific purpose of
deciding whether to overrule Auer. 81 The Court unanimously agreed the
75. GARY LAWSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, DEFERENCE: THE LEGAL CONCEPT AND THE LEGAL
PRACTICE 3 (2019).
76. DeGenaro, supra note 74, at 911 (explaining that the key difference between Chevron
deference and Auer deference is that with Auer deference “an agency serves as both the drafter and
interpreter of ambiguous regulations”).
77. Clarke, supra note 63, at 175–76 (“The future of Auer is also in doubt. . . . [C]ommentators
have chipped away at Auer’s foundations . . . . [and these] concerns have started to stir interest with
the Supreme Court.”). See also Tom Lorenzen, Dan Wolff, & Sharmistha Das, The Final Auer:
Midnight Approaches for an Important Deference Doctrine, TRENDS (A.B.A. Sec. of Env’t, Energy
and
Resources,
Chi.,
Ill.)
Mar.
8,
2019,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
environment_energy_resources/publications/trends/2018-2019/march-april-2019/the-final-auer/
[https://perma.cc/5YN7-2PGM] (“In Kisor v. Wilkie, the Supreme Court stands poised to banish Auer
deference . . . . For Court watchers, it was just a matter of time.”).
78. See Supreme Court Limits Rule That Requires Judges to Defer to Agencies, THOMSON
REUTERS TAX & ACCT. (July 1, 2019), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/supreme-court-limitsrule-that-requires-judges-to-defer-to-agencies/ [https://perma.cc/ST7W-BFDP].
79. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2409 (2019).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2408 (“The only question presented here is whether we should overrule [Auer and
Seminole Rock], discarding the deference they give to agencies.”).
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case should be remanded to the lower court for reconsideration,
admonishing the lower court for not working hard enough to interpret the
meaning of the regulation. 82 The opinion by Justice Kagan also explained
that “the Federal Circuit assumed too fast that Auer deference should
apply in the event of genuine ambiguity. As we have explained, that is not
always true. A court must assess whether the interpretation is of the sort
that Congress would want to receive deference.” 83
The Court in Kisor went further, prescribing a strict five-step process
of analysis for courts considering Auer deference in a given case. First,
Auer deference applies only after the court has established that the
regulation in question is “genuinely ambiguous.” 84 Second, if there is
ambiguity, the agency’s interpretation is valid only if it is reasonable. 85
Third, the agency’s interpretation must reflect the agency’s official
statement regarding the statute and its interpretation; it cannot be merely
a generalized ad hoc statement. 86 Fourth, the agency’s interpretation must
arise from the agency’s expertise on the subject matter.87 Fifth, and
finally, the interpretation must reflect “fair and considered judgment” of
the issue 88 and ought not to represent a new interpretation or one that
conflicts with a prior one. 89
The decision in Kisor was unanimous, but the opinion was not. On
the issue of whether to overturn Auer, the Court voted five to four against,
with Roberts joining Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Ginsburg, and Breyer to
form the majority. 90 In the opinion, written by Kagan, the Court noted
“stare decisis cuts strongly against” overruling Auer deference. 91
C.

Why Auer’s days appeared to be numbered

Individual members of the Supreme Court have made statements,
both in court (by way of judicial opinions, often in dissent) and out of

82. Id. at 2423–24 (“[T]he Federal Circuit jumped the gun in declaring the regulation
ambiguous. . . . Rather, the court must make a conscientious effort to determine, based on indicia like
text, structure, history, and purpose, whether the regulation really has more than one reasonable
meaning.”).
83. Id. at 2424.
84. Id. at 2415 (“[A] court cannot wave the ambiguity flag just because it found the regulation
impenetrable on first read.”).
85. Id. at 2415–16.
86. Id. at 2421.
87. Id. at 2417.
88. Id. at 2417.
89. Id. at 2418.
90. Id. at 2404.
91. Id. at 2422.
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court (in public presentations or interviews), which have road-mapped a
course to overturning Auer, if not Chevron. 92 Their arguments are
persuasive.
The primary argument in favor of overturning Auer, and thus in
opposition to the principle of Auer deference specifically and agency
deference in general, is that it “offends the core principle of the separation
of powers.” 93 Auer in particular is held to be “extremely deferential,”
removing a court’s discretion and, with it, the court’s interpretive
authority over ambiguity in regulatory rules. 94 Auer, it is argued, compels
the court to hand over its judicial role to the agency that promulgated the
regulation in question. 95 Further, because Auer deference leads courts to
turn over interpretive authority to the agencies, those agencies are
encouraged to write rules with ambiguity, so they can later manipulate the
meaning toward whatever end serves them at that time. 96
Although Justice Scalia is no longer a part of the Court, his attitudes
about Auer deference helped to shape the current argument, both for and
against it. To be sure, Scalia was initially a proponent of Auer deference.
He wrote the majority opinion in the 1997 case that gave it its name. 97 But
starting in 2011, with Talk America v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,
Scalia would express discomfort with the very notion of Auer deference,
even to the point of questioning why the Court (why he) had ever
considered it a good idea. 98 In Talk America, writing in a concurring
opinion, he referred to Auer deference, noting that he had “in the past
uncritically accepted that rule” but had since “become increasingly
doubtful of its validity.” 99 More to the point, Scalia stated that when the
Court is eventually asked to reconsider Auer he would “be receptive to

92. See infra notes 93–113.
93. Cynthia Barmore, Auer in Action: Deference After Talk America, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 813,
817 (2015).
94. Alhambra Hosp. v. Thompson, 259 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001).
95. Barmore, supra note 93, at 817‒18.
96. Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1449, 1461 (2011) (describing Auer deference as having “the perverse effect of undermining
agencies’ incentives to adopt clear regulations . . .” because under Auer, an agency will know that
when its rules are ambiguous “it will be able to control their subsequent interpretation”). See also
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 111–12 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that
giving deference to an agency allows that agency’s rules to live outside the boundaries of notice-andcomment, and noting that “there are weighty reasons to deny a lawgiver the power to write ambiguous
laws and then be the judge of what the ambiguity means”).
97. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 454 (1997).
98. Talk America, Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67–69 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
99. Id. at 68.
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doing so.” 100 He would go on to make the case against Auer deference,
and call for overturning it, in numerous subsequent cases. 101
Justice Thomas has been the most critical of Auer deference,
questioning its validity under the Constitution. 102 In a concurring opinion
in 2015, he wrote that Auer deference “raises constitutional concerns”
because it “effects a transfer of the judicial power to an executive agency”
and “undermines [the Court’s] obligation to provide a judicial check on
the other branches.” 103
Justice Kavanaugh was a vocal critic of Auer deference while serving
on the D.C. Circuit. In a 2016 speech, then-Judge Kavanaugh cited Scalia
when he stated that “Auer violates a fundamental principle of separation
of powers.” 104 Kavanaugh went on to directly assert his prediction that
“Auer will someday be overruled and that Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Decker will be the law of the land.” 105
Justice Gorsuch has also been a critic of agency deference in general,
most notably addressing concerns about Chevron deference. Thus, he
foreshadowed his dissent in Kisor while still serving on the Tenth Circuit
Court in his concurring opinion in Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch. 106 “Under
any conception of our separation of powers,” Gorsuch wrote, “I would
have thought powerful and centralized authorities like today’s
administrative agencies would have warranted less deference from other
branches, not more.” 107 Addressing the question directly he stated, “We
managed to live with the administrative state before Chevron. We could
do it again.” 108
During Gorsuch’s confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Senator Orrin Hatch asked him to elaborate on his views
regarding Chevron deference. In his response, echoing the Constitutional

100. Id. at 69.
101. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616–17 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing with apparent dismay that the Court has applied Auer deference
“[f]or decades, and for no good reason,” and that the time had come to overturn it); Perez v. Mortg.
Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 109, 111–12 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing Auer as “an
elaborate law of deference” that encourages agencies to “write substantive rules more broadly and
vaguely, leaving plenty of gaps to be filled in later,” which the Court can best address “by abandoning
Auer”).
102. See Percival, supra note 14, at 5 (“Justice Thomas is the only current Justice who has
declared Auer deference unconstitutional.”).
103. Perez, 575 U.S. at 112–13 (Thomas, J., concurring).
104. The C. Boyden Gray Center, supra note 20, at 18:19 (June 2, 2016).
105. Id. at 19:05.
106. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016).
107. Id. at 1155.
108. Id. at 1158.
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concerns raised earlier by Thomas and Scalia, Gorsuch asked, “What
about the separation of powers? I thought that judges were supposed to
say what the law is.” 109
Prior to Kisor, the Chief Justice had also questioned the wisdom of
Auer and other forms of agency deference, though certainly with less
vigor than his fellow conservative justices. 110 In Decker, in 2013, he had
suggested that the issue warranted reconsideration.111 That same year, in
a different case, Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued
more forcefully in opposition to judicial deference to agencies. In City of
Arlington v. F.C.C., he asserted that “[a] court should not defer to an
agency until the court decides, on its own, that the agency is entitled to
deference.” 112 His concern, as expressed in that case, was about the risk
of the growing administrative state, urging the Court to “not leave it to the
agency to decide when it is in charge.” 113
By the time the Court heard oral arguments for Kisor in early 2019,
Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Gorsuch had firmly established their opposition
to agency deference. The Chief Justice, too, had at least hinted that he had
significant issues with it. Therefore, it would have been reasonable to
believe that, with Kisor, the Court would finally overturn Auer.
III. STARE DECISIS AND THE COURT’S REPUTATION
Three cases over the 2017 and 2018 terms established stare decisis
as something more than a jurisprudential doctrine for the Supreme Court.
It became the Court’s lightning rod, internally and externally. Inside, stare
decisis served to fracture the Court along apparently ideological lines. 114
109. Christopher J. Walker, Gorsuch on Chevron Deference, Round II, YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 23, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/gorsuch-on-chevron-deference-roundii/ [https://perma.cc/5W98-9W8K].
110. See Hessick, supra note 46, at 427 (“[T]he Chief Justice might think Chevron and Auer are
bad ideas, but I doubt [he is] ready to declare them unconstitutional.”).
111. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 615 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
112. City of Arlington, Texas v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 312 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 327 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). He also warned that “the growing power of the
administrative state cannot be dismissed.” Id. at 315.
114. See Jonathan H. Adler, Is This Still the Stare Decisis Court?, REASON: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 24, 2019, 9:31 AM), https://reason.com/2019/06/24/is-this-still-the-stare-decisiscourt/?itm_source=parsely-api [https://perma.cc/KG8Y-FUWW] (noting that “Justice Elena Kagan’s
sharp dissent in Knick v. Township of Scott [in 2019] raised the concern that the Court’s conservative
majority is showing insufficient concern for prior precedent, as did Justice Breyer’s earlier dissent in
Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt.”); Henry Gass, Overruled: Is Precedent in Danger at the Supreme
Court?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 25, 2019), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Justice/2019/0625/Overruled-Is-precedent-in-danger-at-the-Supreme-Court [https://perma.cc/73JVUXKF] (explaining that Supreme Court justices have long debated when to overturn precedent, and
“with a reliably conservative five-justice majority, that debate has surged back to prominence”).
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Externally, stare decisis (and the divided Court that resulted) drew
considerable criticism upon the Court. 115 For these reasons, stare decisis
ultimately played a significant role in the outcome in Kisor.
A.

Benefits and drawbacks of stare decisis

The term “stare decisis” is derived from stare decisis et non quieta
movere, which means “stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the
calm.” 116 As a legal principle, stare decisis was imported as a feature of
the English common law system. 117 In 1788, describing his vision for the
judiciary, Alexander Hamilton explained that “[t]o avoid an arbitrary
discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down
by strict rules and precedents . . . .” 118 The Supreme Court expanded on
this view, describing stare decisis as “a basic self-governing principle
within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and
difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is
not based upon ‘an arbitrary discretion.’” 119
In practice, stare decisis obliges courts to follow prior decisions in
two directions: vertically and horizontally. Vertically, within a given
jurisdiction, the decisions of higher courts legally control those of the
courts below. Horizontally, stare decisis gives prior decisions authority,
even controlling force, over subsequent decisions of that same court on
the same legal question. 120
Generally, support for stare decisis derives from the numerous
benefits it provides. First, it ensures stability, protecting reliance on

115. See, e.g., So Long Stare Decisis, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE: BLOG (Aug. 16, 2019),
https://www.afj.org/article/so-long-stare-decisis/ [https://perma.cc/PFV7-8RGD] (“We have every
reason to worry that the Court’s five conservatives will continue to disregard decades of precedent to
benefit themselves and their right-wing allies.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Does Precedent Matter to
Conservative Justices on the Roberts Court?, ABA JOURNAL (June 27, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky-precedent-matters-little-to-conservatives-onthe-roberts-court [https://perma.cc/Y97P-EUUX] (“Recent decisions of the Roberts Court indicate
that the five conservative justices overall will give little deference to precedents that they want to
overrule.”).
116. Thomas G. Field III, The Role of Stare Decisis in the Federal Court, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 203,
204 (1999) (quoting James C. Rehnquist, The Power That Shall be Vested in a Precedent: Stare
Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 BOS. L. REV. 345, 346 (1986)).
117. See id. at 204‒05.
118. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888).
119. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting THE FEDERALIST
NO. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888)).
120. LIEF H. CARTER & THOMAS F. BURKE, REASON IN LAW 47 (9th ed. 2016).
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judicial decisions as “settled law.” 121 Such stability, in turn, promotes
fairness, because like cases produce like decisions, 122 and judicial
efficiency, as courts relying on earlier decisions may decide the
subsequent cases more quickly. 123 Finally, stare decisis “contributes to the
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” 124 Some, including
the late Justice Brandeis, have even gone so far as to suggest that
consistency in the law, based on stare decisis, is more important than
getting the law “right.” 125
Arguments in opposition to stare decisis have generally focused on
three primary criticisms. First, to the last point above, stare decisis urges

121. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“Stare decisis is the preferred course
because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,
[and] fosters reliance on judicial decisions . . . .”).
122. Michael Gentithes, Precedent, Humility, and Justice, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 835,
845–46 (2012) (“[A] strong theory of precedent is encapsulated by the intuitively appealing doctrine
of treating like cases alike. At its heart, this view suggests that precedent is vital . . . to achieve
consistency in adjudicatory outcomes . . . . Fairness seems to demand that claims that are identical in
all respects other than the time they were raised be resolved the same way . . . . If a meaningful
distinction between the cases is lacking, then it only seems fair that both claimants receive the same
result.”).
123. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 108 (1989) (noting that stare decisis provides economic value to the legal
system “because it lowers uncertainty and hence reduces transaction costs”); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) (addressing the inefficiency that would result
without stare decisis, and noting that “the labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking
point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s own course
of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him”).
124. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827. Also note that much has been made of stare decisis as a significant
contributor to the integrity and reputation of the courts, particularly that of the Supreme Court. E.g.,
Rafael Gely, Of Sinking and Escalating: A (Somewhat) New Look at Stare Decisis, 60 U. PITT. L.
REV. 89, 107 (1998) (“Stare decisis allows courts to strengthen their reputation by promoting the
perception that decisions are consistent over time. Thus, not only fairness in fact, but the appearance
of fairness, are advanced as rationales for the use of stare decisis.”); Leah Litman & Seth Davis, A
Momentous Change May be Upon the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (June 26, 2019, 10:04 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/27/progressive-supreme-court-justices-aresounding-warning-we-should-heed-it/ [https://perma.cc/SP2P-SMF7] (“The doctrine of stare decisis
ensures stability in the law, protects private parties who rely on the law and helps preserve the court’s
reputation as a nonpartisan — or at least not entirely partisan — institution.”). But see Ilya Shapiro,
How the Supreme Court Undermines its own Legitimacy, WASH. EXAMINER (July 18, 2019, 11:00
PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/how-the-supreme-court-undermines-its-ownlegitimacy [https://perma.cc/MP46-KGE4] (describing how one’s view of stare decisis, among other
factors, as impacting the legitimacy of the Court “now also parallels where you sit politically,” asking
“is there any doubt that a progressive majority would act the same way toward conservative
shibboleths?”).
125. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”).
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that past wrong decisions remain in force, 126 which can then perpetuate
through subsequent rulings based on the earlier wrong ones. 127 Second,
stare decisis places all emphasis on prior decisions, not on prior decisionmaking. 128 As such, judges can “pick and choose” earlier holdings that
provide the conclusion they seek in the present case, giving the judiciary
the power to legislate from the bench. 129 Some have argued further that
stare decisis, at least to some extent, subverts 130 the very role of the judge
to “say what the law is.” 131 Based on this perspective, stare decisis
encourages a form of intellectual laziness among judges who can rely on
precedent rather than embarking anew on a thorough legal analysis of a
given case. 132 Alternatively, this suggests that stare decisis puts judicial
power in the hands of judges and justices of the past, which, according to
Justices Scalia and Douglas, undercuts the current judge’s duty to the
Constitution. 133 Third, and finally, reliance on past decisions restricts the

126. Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare
Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2040 (1996) (“[S]tare decisis sometimes requires perpetuating
erroneous decisions in the name of consistency.”).
127. Id. at 2033–34 (“A single erroneous court decision, if followed, becomes two erroneous
decisions, then three, and soon a ‘line’ of cases.”).
128. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576 (1987) (“If precedent is seen
as a rule directing a decisionmaker to take prior decisions into account, then it follows that a pure
argument from precedent, unlike an argument from experience, depends only on the results of those
decisions, and not on the validity of the reasons supporting those results.”).
129. See generally Adam N. Steinman, To Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers
of Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L. REV. 1737, 1743–45 (2013). See also Peters, supra note 125,
at 2034 (“Courts may be adept at manipulating precedent to reach decisions they want to reach . . . .”).
130. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
23, 26 (1994). “This is the true import of Chief Justice Marshall’s oft-misunderstood injunction that
‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’ The court
must decide the case in accordance with law, and a vital part of the judicial task is to determine
whether a claimed source of law—even one that seems prima facie to be a proper subject of judicial
cognizance—may be inapplicable to the case at hand because it conflicts with some hierarchically
superior legal source.” (quoting Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
131. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
132. See Macey, supra note 122, at 102 (“[N]ot even the best judges go about formulating what
they believe to be the substantively correct legal result in every case, and then checking that result
with the relevant precedents. Instead, judges generally employ stare decisis precisely because it
enables them to avoid having to rethink the merits of particular legal doctrine. Instead of rethinking,
the judges can ‘free-ride’ on the opinions of previous judges.”).
133. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I agree with
Justice Douglas: ‘A judge looking at a constitutional decision may have compulsions to revere past
history and accept what was once written. But he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution
which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors may have put on it.’”
(quoting William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949))).
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judiciary in its ability to respond to the “mores of the day,” the current
social and political environments, and modern standards of justice. 134
For these reasons, courts have reserved the right―perhaps the
responsibility―to overturn precedent under certain conditions. In
simplest terms, stare decisis gives way when the court has valid legal
grounds for doing so. 135 When the prior decision that governs the current
one is poorly reasoned or fails to reflect current realities or standards, the
Court “has never felt constrained to follow precedent.” 136 Thus, in
practice, stare decisis is generally a flexible doctrine. 137
To this point, the Supreme Court has previously established that, in
overturning settled precedent, the Court must go beyond the mere belief
that the prior holding was erroneous and find “special justification.” 138
The Court has relied on a variety of factors to form the basis of such
special justification. In Janus v. American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees, Council 31, the Court held that the inquiry into
whether to set aside stare decisis should include considerations of five
such factors: “the quality of reasoning [behind the prior decision], the
workability of the rule it establishe[s], its consistency with other related
decisions, developments since the decision was handed down, and
reliance on the decision.” 139
B.

Overturning precedent in the Roberts Court

John Roberts assumed his position as Chief Justice in 2005. Since
that time, the Court moved to either directly overrule or at least sidestep
established precedent on three occasions between 2005 and 2016.

134. See James C. Rehnquist, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis,
the Constitution, and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 348 (1986) (“[N]o discussion of stare
decisis can ignore the stark tension between the doctrine’s literal command—obey precedents!—and
the law’s ability to respond to social change.”); Field, supra note 116, at 207–08 (“[T]here are limits
to stare decisis. Our system of law is organic: It constantly evolves and adapts with the changing
needs of society.” (citing generally William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 735–
36 (1949))).
135. See Parisis G. Filippatos, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Protection of Civil Rights
and Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 11 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 335, 339 (1991).
136. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944).
137. See Peters, supra note 125, at 2034 (“[T]he rule of stare decisis as currently observed in
Anglo-American law is not a strict one: Courts can decline to follow their own previous decisions
when those precedents are judged to be clearly in error.”).
138. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (“Although adherence to precedent is not
rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands
special justification.”).
139. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478–79
(2018).
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In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court broadened
Second Amendment protections for firearm possession, distinguishing a
69-year-old ruling. 140 In 2010, in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, it held that a ban on corporate donations to political
campaigns was unconstitutional, overturning a 20-year-old precedent. 141
And in 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court overturned a 44-year-old
law when it held that marriage is a fundamental right of same-sex couples
guaranteed by the constitution. 142 In the two earlier cases, the Court was
split five-to-four with the more conservative wing in the majority
(consisting at that time of Roberts, Scalia, Alito, Thomas, and
Kennedy). 143 In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy joined the Court’s four more
liberal justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) to form the
five-to-four majority. 144
Following this, the Court then overturned longstanding precedents
on three more occasions over the span of just two terms. In all three cases,
the decisions were five to four, with the conservative members of the
Court in the majority, and the liberal justices in dissent.
In Knick v. Township of Scott, Pa., a divided Court held that an owner
of a 90-acre property with a small family graveyard had a § 1983 takings
claim against the town, overturning the 1985 holding of Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City. 145 In dissent, Justice Kagan attacked the Knick majority’s lack of

140. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In a dissenting opinion, Justice
Stevens argued that the majority was overturning United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), in
which the Court held that the federal indictment of two men for transporting an unregistered shotgun
was constitutional because the defendants’ possession of the weapon was for nonmilitary purposes.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In response, the majority, led by Justice Scalia,
argued that the Miller Court had upheld the federal statute as constitutional because of the type of
weapon the defendants had possessed in that case, not because their purpose was nonmilitary in
nature. Id. at 621‒22.
141. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 318 (2010), overruling Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
142. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 647 (2015), overruling Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810
(1972).
143. Heller, 554 U.S. at 572; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 317.
144. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 648.
145. Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2179 (2019), overruling
Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). In
Knick, the town had passed an ordinance that required all cemeteries in the town to remain open and
accessible to the public during daylight hours. The town alerted the owner that she was in violation,
so she filed a claim in Federal District Court. On authority of Williamson County, the district court
dismissed the case because the owner had not sought compensation first, under state law, in state
court. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, overruling Williamson County in the
process. The Court held that the state litigation requirement would result in no ability to appeal to

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss1/4

22

Warczak: The Cobra Effect

2020]

THE COBRA EFFECT

133

authority and disregard for stare decisis. “[T]he majority’s only citation is
to last Term’s decision overruling a 40-year-old precedent. If that is the
way the majority means to proceed—relying on one subversion of stare
decisis to support another—we may as well not have principles about
precedents at all.” 146
In Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, a complex case
regarding a state claim of sovereign immunity from private suits brought
in another state’s courts, the Supreme Court again overruled a 40-year-old
precedent, Nevada v. Hall. 147 Justice Breyer, writing in dissent,
specifically asserted that stare decisis “requires us to follow Hall, not
overrule it.” 148 He explained that stare decisis is important because people
“rely upon stability in the law. . . . Each time the Court overrules a case,
the Court produces increased uncertainty. . . . and . . . cause[s] the public
to become increasingly uncertain about which cases the Court will
overrule and which cases are here to stay.” 149
In Janus, handed down in late June 2018, the Court overturned
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, a 1977 case in which the Court held
constitutionally valid state agency fee schemes compelling public
employees to contribute to the union. 150 The district court in Janus
dismissed the case on the authority of Abood, and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed. But the Supreme Court reversed and overturned Abood,

federal court if the landowner’s compensation claim failed in state court, under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2171.
146. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2190 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
147. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1490 (2019), overruling Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). In Franchise Tax Board, a Nevada taxpayer sued the California Tax Board
in Nevada state court for alleged torts and bad-faith conduct during audits. The Nevada state court
allowed the claim to proceed and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed and remanded. A jury trial resulted
in judgment for the taxpayer and the Board appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, which affirmed
in part and reversed/remanded in part. U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded. The Nevada
Supreme Court, on remand, affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. The U.S. Supreme Court
held that states retain their sovereign immunity in such cases, overruling Nevada v. Hall. Franchise
Tax Bd., 139 S. Ct. at 1490–91.
148. Franchise Tax Bd., 139 S. Ct. at 1504 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1506.
150. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018),
overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977). Prior to Janus, the Illinois
governor had filed a claim challenging the constitutionality of an Illinois statute which authorized
public-sector unions to assess “agency fees” on public employees who choose not to be members.
After the district court dismissed the Governor’s action for lack of standing, the case was refiled by
Mark Janus. Janus was a state employee whose unit was represented by a public-sector union which
Janus refused to join for political reasons. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Janus and overturned
a 40-year-old precedent. The Court held that the state’s assessment of agency fees from public sector
employees without their consent was a form of coerced speech, in violation of employees’ First
Amendment free speech rights. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460–62.
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rejecting it as “poorly reasoned.” 151 In a sharply worded dissenting
opinion, Justice Kagan decried the majority’s dismissal of stare decisis.
“Rarely if ever has the Court overruled a decision—let alone one of this
import—with so little regard for the usual principles of stare decisis.” 152
C.

The Court’s reputation in recent years

While the Court’s reputation has ebbed and flowed over time, there
are indications that it has taken a decidedly more negative turn in recent
years. 153 According to Jeffrey Rosen, a law professor at the George
Washington University Law School, public perceptions of the Supreme
Court are at issue, perhaps more than ever before. In a 2016 interview, he
stated that “[t]here’s no question that citizens are looking closely at the
[C]ourt.” 154
Poll data supports Rosen’s assertion. Gallup polls in 2000 and 2018
reveal that public approval of the Court has declined in that time. In 2000,
62% of respondents indicated they approved of the way the Supreme
Court was handling its job, with 29% disapproving. In September 2018,
the numbers were 51% approving, 40% disapproving. 155 Polls also show
that views of the Supreme Court are generally bifurcated along political
party lines. Among Republicans, perceptions of the Court have skewed
more positive since 2015 (from 55% then to 75% in 2019), while views
among Democrats have grown less favorable (from 72% in 2016 to 49%
in 2019). 156
Many factors have contributed to the recent decline in the Court’s
public reputation. Perhaps, most notable are the controversies surrounding

151. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
152. Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
153. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV.
2240, 2241–42 (2019) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME
COURT (2018)) (“Although the Supreme Court has been subject to attacks in the past, recent decades
have been a period of relative calm. . . . But things seem to have changed—and in very short order.”).
154. Gass, supra note 32.
155. In Depth: Topics A to Z, supra note 33. The question asked was, “Do you approve or
disapprove of the way the Supreme Court is handling its job?” Results were as follows: 2000, 62%
approve, 29% disapprove, 9% no opinion; 2019, 54% approve, 42% disapprove, 4% no opinion. Id.
156. Claire Brockway & Bradley Jones, Partisan Gap Widens in Views of the Supreme Court,
PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/07/partisan-gapwidens-in-views-of-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/F5KN-53BG]. In a July 2019 Pew Research
Poll, 75% of Republican or Republican-leaning respondents had a favorable view of the Supreme
Court, compared with 33% in mid-2015. Meanwhile, 49% of Democratic or Democratic-leaning
respondents held a favorable view of the Court in 2019, compared with 72% in 2016. The gap is more
pronounced among the conservative Republicans (78% favorable in July 2019) compared with the
liberal Democrats (40% favorable in July 2019). Id.
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Merrick Garland’s failed nomination in early 2016 and Brett Kavanaugh’s
dramatic confirmation hearings in 2018. 157 In addition to this, the Court’s
decisions themselves may feed the perceived “politicization” of the Court
that “causes the American people to lose faith in the Court.” 158
Public accusations and criticism of the Court by public officials,
especially the President, also serve to undercut the Court’s reputation. By
calling the Court’s integrity into question, the Court’s reputation takes a
direct public hit. Doing this also serves to erode the Court’s reputation
indirectly by calling attention to the Court in a mostly political context.
Even without taking any action, the Court may be seen as political by
association. 159
One incident illustrating this point involved the president publicly
criticizing the Court and thereby drawing attention to the Court in a highly
political context. 160 During his 2010 State of the Union address, President
Obama condemned the Citizens United ruling, which had come down a
week earlier. With six members of the Court sitting in the front two rows
of the House chambers, the President directly chastised the Court for
“revers[ing] a century of law.” 161 Democratic Senators, surrounding the
members of the Court in attendance, stood and cheered the President’s
statements. 162 While this was not the first time a President had criticized
the Court or its decisions, 163 this incident garnered attention. It also drew

157. Tomasky, supra note 35. In describing the effects of recent events on the Court’s
reputation, Tomasky referred to the Senate’s failure to vote on the nomination of Judge Merrick
Garland as “breaking the rules” and how Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation was marred by allegations
of sexual misconduct. He also noted that multiple Justices have been confirmed by legislators
representing minority support and that Justice Gorsuch was the first justice nominated by a president
who had not won the popular vote. Id.
158. Hamilton, supra note 34, at 36.
159. See generally Pomerance, supra note 36.
160. Id. at 522.
161. Alan Silverleib, Gloves Come Off After Obama Rips Supreme Court Ruling, CNN:
POLITICS (Jan. 28, 2010, 1:26 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/01/28/
alito.obama.sotu/index.html [https://perma.cc/6XZN-CM65].
162. Savage, supra note 38. See also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front
of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/
us/politics/29scotus.html [https://perma.cc/R92D-VM2H], which includes a photo of the justices in
attendance surrounded by applauding Democratic members of Congress.
163. In 2008, President George W. Bush was critical of the Court’s holding in Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), that prisoners held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, had constitutional due
process rights. However, here, the president made his remarks while in Rome during a news
conference. President Richard M. Nixon expressed disappointment with the 1974 Court decision that
ultimately led to his resignation. Nixon’s comments were delivered in a prepared statement read by
his lawyer. See Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, supra note 161.
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some criticism to the President for being particularly public, personal, and
disrespectful in his attack. 164
Another example occurred in early 2020. Senator Chuck Schumer
made comments critical of the Court to a crowd of activists outside the
Supreme Court building, while the Court was hearing arguments in a highprofile abortion case inside. Schumer, the Senate Minority leader, referred
to Gorsuch and Kavanaugh by name when he exclaimed that “[y]ou have
released the whirlwind, and you will pay the price. You will not know
what hit you if you go forward with these awful decisions.” 165 Other
political leaders quickly responded, rebuking Schumer for his comments.
President Trump, for example, described the remarks as “a direct [and]
dangerous threat to the U.S. Supreme Court.” 166 Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell spoke out for more than fifteen minutes from the Senate
floor, accusing Schumer of “bully[ing] our nation’s independent
judiciary.” 167 The verbal sparring, which included numerous senators and
representatives, was joined by the media. One online political news and
opinion forum, The Hill, perhaps summarized the entire debate most aptly,
explaining that it was “igniting a partisan fight over the Supreme
Court.” 168
D.

Chief Justice Roberts seeks to protect the Court’s reputation

The Chief Justice serves as the presiding officer of the Court, a
largely administrative role prescribed by the Judiciary Act of 1789. 169 But
164. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, President Wrong on Citizens United Case, NATIONAL REVIEW:
THE CORNER (Jan. 28, 2010, 4:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/president-wrongcitizens-united-case-bradley-smith/ [https://perma.cc/54J6-LK4P] (“Tonight the president engaged in
demogoguery [sic] of the worst kind . . . . This is either blithering ignorance of the law or
demagoguery of the worst kind.”).
165. Adam Liptak, John Roberts Condemns Schumer for Saying Justices ‘Will Pay the Price’
for ‘Awful Decisions,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/04/us/robertsschumer-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/A73H-DZ38].
166. Id. (noting also President Trump’s statement on Twitter that if Schumer’s comments had
been made by a Republican, “he or she would be arrested, or impeached”).
167. Andrew Desiderio, Schumer Walks Back SCOTUS Comments After Roberts Rebuke,
POLITICO (last updated Mar. 5, 2020, 1:03 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/05/chuckschumer-supreme-court-comments-121960 [https://perma.cc/3YVU-2EFP].
168. Jordain Carney & Harper Neidig, Schumer, Roberts Clash Inflames Partisan Rift Over
Supreme Court, THE HILL (Mar. 5, 2020, 4:34 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/486207schumer-roberts-clash-inflames-partisan-rift-over-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/CU3E-9WQ2].
169. See Robert Longley, Duties of the Chief Justice of the United States, THOUGHTCO (last
updated Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/chief-justice-of-united-states-duties-3322405
[https://perma.cc/4PVH-7HS4], for a summary of the United States Chief Justice’s roles and
responsibilities. See also Kristin Linsley Myles, Michelle Friedland, Aimee Feinberg, Miriam Seifter
& Michael Mongan, Hail to the Chief, 48-Aug TENN. B.J. 12 (2012).
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beyond the various procedural duties, the Chief Justice has also served an
unofficial position as steward of the Court’s integrity and reputation. 170
Roberts takes this role seriously. 171 His words and actions as Chief Justice
reflect someone who cares about the Court’s institutional legitimacy, the
judiciary’s place among the branches of government, and its position in
history. 172 According to author and law professor Eric Segall, 173 “Roberts
cares a lot about the Supreme Court as an institution.”174 In fact, according
to Segall, Roberts may feel “that he’s the only thing that prevents the
Court from losing all legitimacy in the eyes of the public.” 175
Of particular concern for Roberts is the perception that the Court is
political or otherwise partial to the ideologies of the individual justices.176
According to Sara Benesh, a political scientist at the University of
Wisconsin–Milwaukee who was quoted in a 2019 article, “[t]he [C]ourt
has this position institutionally where the only power it has is people’s

170. See Morning Edition, Fear and Loathing at the Supreme Court ‒ What is Chief Justice
John Roberts Up To? (NPR radio broadcast July 8, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/08/738930098/fear-and-loathing-at-the-supreme-court-what-is-chiefjustice-john-roberts-up-to [https://perma.cc/YHJ8-7AWM] (“[C]hief [J]ustices — Republican and
Democratic, liberal and conservative alike — have uniformly believed that they have a particular duty
to maintain public confidence in the [C]ourt as an institution.”).
171. In her book about the Chief Justice, Joan Biskupic describes how Roberts “was . . .
concerned . . . with the institutional reputation of the Court,” BISKUPIC, supra note 37, at 177, to the
extent that, she wrote, “[s]ometimes it seemed this concern was overriding.” Id. at 197. In his 2019
annual report to the judiciary, Roberts himself urged judges to “continue their efforts to promote
public confidence in the judiciary,” and to do their best “to maintain the public’s trust . . . .” HON.
JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2019 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (Dec. 31, 2019),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2019year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF2EB5DT].
172. See Melissa Quinn, John Roberts is Voting with Liberal Justices, But He’s Not One of
Them, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 8, 2019, 12:03 AM) (quoting Brianne Gorod, Chief Counsel of the
Constitutional Accountability Center, who said “[t]he Supreme Court’s reputation is something the
chief justice cares a lot about . . . . [He] cares very deeply about the institutional legitimacy of the
Supreme Court and the courts more generally”), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/
policy/courts/john-roberts-is-voting-with-liberal-justices-but-hes-not-one-of-them
[https://perma.cc/KWL5-A8EF].
ST.
U.,
https://news.gsu.edu/expert/eric-j-segall/
173. Eric
J.
Segall,
GA.
[https://perma.cc/3FSS-3GJ4].
(Aug.
1,
2019),
174. Bill
Blum,
Supremely
Conservative,
PROGRESSIVE,
https://progressive.org/magazine/supremely-conservative-blum/ [https://perma.cc/2S8M-22HS].
175. Id.
176. See Quinn, supra note 171 (“Roberts himself has publicly sought to dispel any notion that
the justices — and the federal judiciary as a whole — are driven by politics.”). See also The Editorial
Board, An Apolitical Supreme Court, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2019, 7:30 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-apolitical-supreme-court-11569454257 [https://perma.cc/RKT854VQ] (describing how Chief Justice Roberts recognizes that people often see the Court as a political
body, but wants them to understand that the Court does not function that way).
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voluntary compliance with its decisions.” 177 Accordingly, Benesh said,
the Court needs to appear to be above politics whenever possible, and “the
chief is in a particularly important position on that.” 178
That the Chief Justice is protective of, or at least sensitive to, the
Court’s reputation was evident in his responses to specific incidents where
the Court’s integrity was questioned publicly and in a political context.
For example, Roberts publicly expressed his distaste for the President’s
criticism of the Court during the 2010 State of the Union address
described above. 179 “The image of having the members of one branch of
government standing up, literally surrounding the Supreme Court,
cheering and hollering,” he said, “while the Court―according to the
requirements of protocol―has to sit there expressionless, I think is very
troubling.” 180
Roberts has responded directly to attacks by President Trump as
well. In late 2018, the President lashed out regarding a Ninth Circuit Court
ruling to block his asylum ban, calling the court a “disgrace” and referring
to the author of the court’s opinion as an “Obama judge.” The Chief
Justice issued a statement in response, explaining, “[w]e do not have
Obama judges or Trump judges . . . [but] an extraordinary group of
dedicated judges doing their level best . . . .” 181
Finally, after Senator Chuck Schumer verbally attacked Justices
Kavanaugh and Gorsuch in early 2020, 182 Roberts condemned the senator.
In a statement released later the same day that Schumer made his
comments, Roberts expressed concern that “threatening statements of this
sort from the highest levels of government are not only inappropriate, they
are dangerous. All Members of the Court will continue to do their job,
without fear or favor, from whatever quarter.” 183
It is not entirely clear what the Chief Justice is trying to accomplish.
On the one hand, he may be seeking to maintain the Court’s institutional
integrity by ensuring actual impartiality. Or Roberts’s aim may be to build
the Court’s reputation based on appearances of the Court as an apolitical
177. Henry Gass, Why Chief Justice Roberts is Moving to the Center of the Court, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2019/0326/Why-ChiefJustice-Roberts-is-moving-to-the-center-of-the-court [https://perma.cc/YH3X-3TH9].
178. Id.
179. Supra Part III, Section C.
180. Savage, supra note 38.
181. Barnes, supra note 39.
182. See Liptak, supra note 164.
183. Ariane de Vogue, Chief Justice John Roberts Rebukes Chuck Schumer for Comments About
Kavanaugh and Gorsuch, CNN (last updated Mar. 4, 2020, 9:06 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/04/politics/schumer-roberts-threats-supreme-court/index.html
[https://perma.cc/724Z-NY8T].
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institution. 184 Either way, his public statements 185 and actions on the
Court, which include forging compromises and voting with his liberal
colleagues at times, demonstrate that Roberts’s concern for the Court’s
reputation is genuine and provides a clue as to how he best sees his role
in protecting it. 186 His vote in Kisor is but one example.
IV. THE COBRA EFFECT IN KISOR: GOOD INTENTIONS, BAD RESULT
Kisor arrived amidst growing concern about the Court’s institutional
reputation 187 and at a time when the Court had overturned longstanding
precedent on multiple occasions in the prior two terms. 188 This section
will lay out, first, how Kisor represented an example of Roberts
attempting to create a compromise among the Court, deferring to stare
decisis for the sake of the Court’s reputation. 189 Stare decisis will then be
critically examined for its value as a legal doctrine and as a means of
preserving the Court’s public standing. 190 Next, it will be shown that the
result in Kisor, by which Auer deference was upheld but significantly
weakened, represents the cobra effect at work. For all of Roberts’s
intentions, his actions and the result in Kisor will ultimately do more to
damage the Court’s reputation than to support it. 191 From this, it can then
be demonstrated that the Court must overturn Auer once and for all.
A.

Kisor revisited: Chief Justice Roberts plays centrist

The decision in Kisor, in which the Court upheld but limited the
reach of Auer, illustrates three prominent features of the Court’s
jurisprudence under Roberts. None of the three have anything to do with
agency deference.
First, Kisor represents another example of the Court’s recent
emphasis on stare decisis, as stare decisis was at the heart of the result.
Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, explained that stare decisis
discouraged the Court from overruling Auer. 192 The Court, she asserted,

184. BISKUPIC, supra note 37, at 197 (“With his focus on the public’s perception, the chief
justice seemed more concerned with protecting the judiciary’s reputation than with ferreting out actual
impartiality.”).
185. For examples, see Roberts’s comments described above, supra Part III, Section D.
186. See supra Part III, Section D.
187. See supra Part III, Section B.
188. See supra Part III, Section B.
189. Infra Part IV, Section A.
190. Infra Part IV, Section B.
191. Infra Part IV, Section C.
192. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2418 (2019).
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lacked the “special justification” 193 previously deemed necessary for
overturning settled precedent. 194 Doing so here, she wrote, would involve
overruling “not a single case, but a long line of precedents . . . going back
75 years or more.” 195
In his concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch alluded to stare decisis in
explaining that the Court should have overturned Auer. 196 Specifically, he
noted that the substantial “reshaping” of the Auer deference test imposed
by the Court was tantamount to overruling Auer. 197 But because of the
extent to which Auer deference dictates “‘the interpretive inferences that
future Justices must draw in construing statutes and regulations that the
Court has never engaged,’” Gorsuch argued that upholding Auer “may
well ‘exceed the limits of stare decisis.’” 198
Second, Kisor also showcases the (perhaps uncomfortable) role
Roberts is now trying to play: that of a centrist. Observers noted that
Justice Kennedy had played the role of the Court’s centrist or “swing
vote”―that is, a justice who might side with his ideologically opposing
colleagues on certain issues, thus casting the decisive vote in strongly
divided cases. 199 Kennedy, himself, a conservative appointed by President
Reagan in 1986, had gradually replaced Justice Sandra Day O’Connor as
the “center of the Court.” 200 Following Kennedy’s retirement in 2018,
commentators began to speculate as to whether Roberts might take over
as the Court’s center. 201
193. As noted above, supra note 137, the need for a “special justification” to overturn settled
precedent was first suggested in Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).
194. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418.
195. Id. at 2422.
196. Id. at 2425–48 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 2443.
198. Id. at 2444 (quoting Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference,
and the Law of Stare Decisis, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1158 (2019)).
199. Ephrat Livni, John Roberts May Be the New Swing Vote on the US Supreme Court,
QUARTZ (Dec. 24, 2018), https://qz.com/1506186/chief-justice-roberts-the-new-swing-vote-onsupreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/S38V-RUB3]. See also Horace E. Johns, Nine Means to an End, 39
TENN. B.J. 26, 32 (2003) (“Justice Kennedy has moved steadily toward the center of the court, and
away from his solid conservatism . . . .”).
200. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 40
(Anchor Books ed. 2008) (referring to O’Connor as the “social as well as the political center of the
Court”).
201. See Pomerance, supra note 36, at 457 (“[O]ne could genuinely see the Chief Justice filling
Kennedy’s shoes as the Court’s ideological center.”); Julie Hirschfeld Davis, With Kennedy Gone,
Roberts Will Be the Supreme Court’s Swing Vote, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/us/politics/anthony-kennedy-chief-justice-roberts.html
[https://perma.cc/G5UK-5KVF] (“The retirement of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy is likely to thrust
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. into the court’s ideological center, making him the deciding vote . . .
alongside a newly solidified conservative majority.”).
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There are examples of Robert’s “centrist” efforts predating
Kennedy’s retirement. Perhaps most notable was the 2012 case, National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. 202 Roberts caught the
wrath of conservatives after he voted in Sebelius to uphold the Affordable
Care Act, sponsored by President Obama. 203 In 2014, Roberts voted to bar
a state action that would prevent a Native American tribe from operating
a casino on land outside its reservation on the basis of tribal sovereign
immunity. 204 He then voted with the liberal wing of the Court in two cases
in 2015. First, in Yates v. United States, the Court determined that a fish
was not a “tangible object” for purposes of determining violations of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 205 In the second case, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,
the Court held that states imposing a bar on the solicitation of funds by
judicial candidates for their campaigns did not violate the First
Amendment. 206 In 2018, Roberts voted to deny the Trump
Administration’s effort to reinstate its policy restricting grants of asylum
for illegal immigrants. 207 Then, in 2019, there was Kisor. 208
The third point to be drawn from the Kisor outcome is that it provides
a specific example of Roberts acting to support and nurture the Court’s
reputation. Political scientists have known for decades that the ideology
of a judge is predictive of his or her voting. 209 But the image of
impartiality is what is perhaps most important when it comes to the
reputation of the Court. 210 Roberts has been particularly active in asserting
202. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). See also Adam Liptak,
Supreme Court Upholds Health Care Law, 5-4, in Victory for Obama, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/us/supreme-court-lets-health-law-largely-stand.html
[https://perma.cc/DH3Y-R8QX].
203. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Chief Justice Roberts was Principled but Wrong in his
Obamacare Decision, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 6, 2016, 4:19 PM),
https://reason.com/2016/05/06/chief-justice-roberts-was-prin/ [https://perma.cc/PQ85-7DFY] (“[I]t
was Chief Justice Roberts’s decision to defer . . . that demoralized constitutional conservatives.”).
204. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782 (2014).
205. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015).
206. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015).
207. Trump v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 139 S. Ct. 782 (Mem) (2018). See also Lyle
Denniston, Supreme Court Keeps Asylum Limits on Hold, CONSTITUTION DAILY (Dec. 21, 2018),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/supreme-court-keeps-asylum-limits-on-hold
[https://perma.cc/78SQ-LT67].
208. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
209. See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND
VALUE, 1937–1947 (Digital Edition, Quid Pro Books 2014). Pritchett argued that Supreme Court
Justices and judges generally were biased and political in nature, noting that “[a]ny examination of
the present-day Court must accept the fact that its decisions inevitably have a political character, and
the real question is not whether, but how well, its justices perform political functions.” Id. at 45.
210. See BISKUPIC, supra note 37, at 9 (“Roberts understood that public regard was crucial to
the Supreme Court’s stature in American life.”).
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that the Court is an “apolitical branch of government.” 211 Taking the point
a step further, Roberts may be showing us by his use of the “swing vote”
that it will be he who will serve to bridge the gap between the two sides
of the Court, if not the country. 212
On multiple occasions, Roberts has expressed his concern for the
legitimacy of the Court, often promoting the Court’s impartial, apolitical
nature. 213 For example, during an appearance at Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute with the school’s president Shirley Ann Jackson, Roberts said,
“[W]e in the judiciary do not do our business in a partisan, ideological
manner.” 214
Beyond his words, Roberts’s actions may be demonstrating his role
as de facto steward of the Court’s reputation and institutional integrity.
There are instances of Roberts voting with the liberal wing of the Court,
reflecting his migration to the center. These likely represent calculated
attempts by Roberts to move the Court in a particular direction, with the
general goal of protecting the Court’s reputation. For example, observers
have suggested that the outcome in Sebelius reflects Roberts’s concern
that the Court’s reputation would have been damaged had it moved to
strike down the Affordable Care Act. 215 Pundits have argued that Roberts,
who wrote the majority opinion in Sibelius, changed his vote and then
stretched to provide a rationale to justify that decision.216

211. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Chief Justice Tries to Assure the Supreme Court is Apolitical, but
Term’s Biggest Cases Present Partisan Challenges, WASH. POST (June 16, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/chief-justice-assures-the-supreme-court-isapolitical-hes-facing-his-next-big-test/2019/06/16/8603bac6-8def-11e9-8f69a2795fca3343_story.html [https://perma.cc/F8WN-YVU3] (“People need to know we’re not doing
politics . . . .”).
212. Livni, supra note 198. See also Richard Wolf, Chief Justice John Roberts Inherits
Expanded Role as the Supreme Court’s Man in the Middle, USA TODAY (June 29, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/06
/29/chief-justice-john-roberts-supremecourts-new-man-middle/743208002/ [https://perma.cc/R8HN-USNN] (“With the retirement of
Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy, the court’s most influential member by virtue of his ‘swing vote’
status, Roberts will move to the middle . . . .”).
213. Roberts’s concern for the legitimacy of the Court is described in Part III above. See supra
Part III, Section D.
214. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, A Conversation with Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.,
YOUTUBE (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TuZEKlRgDEg&t=1363s
[https://perma.cc/G6YY-RQSB].
215. See, e.g., Grove, supra note 152, at 2254 (“According to media reports, the Chief Justice
believed that the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate was unconstitutional. But after a barrage
of criticism declaring that a ruling against President Obama’s signature legislation would destroy the
Court’s reputation, the Chief Justice opted to change his vote; he then relied on a ‘strained’ theory
that the mandate was valid under the federal taxing power.”).
216. Id.
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Cases in 2019 and 2020 further illustrate how Roberts has voted
against his more conservative tendencies for the benefit of the Court’s
reputation. In Department of Commerce v. New York, Roberts sided with
the Court’s liberal wing to block the inclusion of a citizenship question in
the 2020 census. 217 Roberts wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor. In the decision, Roberts
explained that the administration’s rationale for including the question
“seems to have been contrived.” 218 But he also noted that the Constitution
does not block the inclusion of a citizenship question in the future. Roberts
appears to have controlled the outcome of the case by way of a
compromise, likely intended to avoid more criticism directed at the
Court. 219
In June 2020, Roberts again cast a decisive fifth vote in June Medical
Services v. Russo. 220 Roberts joined the Court’s liberal justices in striking
down a restrictive Louisiana abortion law, a near mirror-image of a similar
law in Texas which the Court had struck down four years earlier in Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. 221 In his concurring opinion in June
Medical Services, Roberts specifically cited stare decisis as the sole factor
in his decision. 222 He dedicated the first section of his opinion to the
importance of stare decisis, before embarking on a sharp critique of the
Whole Woman’s Health holding, reiterating his dissent in that case. 223
Commentators were quick to take note. 224 For example, The Economist
217. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
218. Id. at 2575.
219. Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Chief Justice’s ‘Swing’ Role Shown in Census, Gerrymandering
Rulings, REUTERS (June 27, 2019, 6:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-courtchiefjustice/u-s-chief-justices-swing-role-shown-in-census-gerrymandering-rulingsidUSKCN1TS3A4 [https://perma.cc/CD8Z-UZWU] (“The census ruling in particular showcased the
willingness of Roberts to craft compromises.”).
220. June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
221. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2113 (noting that the lower court’s findings regarding the
abortion regulation in question “mirror those made in Whole Woman’s Health in every relevant
respect and require the same result”); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
222. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2141–42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Stare decisis instructs
us to treat like cases alike. The result in this case is controlled by our decision four years ago
invalidating a nearly identical Texas law . . . . For that reason, I concur in the judgment of the
Court . . . .”).
223. Id. at 2133 (“I joined the dissent in Whole Woman’s Health and continue to believe that
the case was wrongly decided.”). See also Gretchen Borchelt, June Medical Services v. Russo: When
a
“Win” Is Not a Win, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2020, 12:31 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/symposium-june-medical-services-v-russo-when-a-win-isnot-a-win/ [https://perma.cc/SC3B-MBUP] (“Roberts spends the bulk of his concurrence on his
disdain for Whole Woman’s Health . . . .”).
224. See Jane Schacter, June Medical and the Many Faces of Judicial Discretion,
(June
30,
2020,
1:22
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/
SCOTUSBLOG
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described Roberts’s vote as evidence of his effort to “cultivat[e] a
reputation for non-partisanship at the Supreme Court.” 225
In light of these prior cases, most notably Sebelius, it is reasonable
to believe that incidents of Roberts joining the liberal justices and casting
the decisive vote in a case reveal his concern for the institutional integrity
of the Court. Such concern arises from a larger sense of his role in
protecting the Court’s reputation, beyond the specific facts or
jurisprudential implications of any specific case. Kisor is no exception. It
is telling that the result in Kisor, upholding Auer, came on the heels of
multiple five-to-four decisions in a short period, wherein the Court had
struck down settled precedents. 226 It is also meaningful that the Court
upheld Auer by the narrowest of terms, with the Court insisting that lower
courts make a more concerted effort at interpreting regulations before
deferring to the agency’s proposed interpretation. This outcome
represents an effort by Roberts to offer a compromise―to appease the left
by deferring to stare decisis on the one hand, while appeasing the right by
restricting agency deference on the other.
B.

Stare decisis and the Court’s reputation

As described above, 227 one argument in support of stare decisis is
that it plays a significant role in supporting the integrity of the judicial
process. 228 Reliance on settled law contributes to the public reputation of
the Supreme Court as an institution. 229 Legitimacy in judicial rulings
depends on the influence of binding legal principles rather than personal

june-medical-and-the-many-faces-of-judicial-discretion/ [https://perma.cc/V7P2-UDXU]
(explaining that Roberts’s vote in June Medical Services was “significant” not only because “he
determined the outcome,” but for its contribution to “stability in constitutional law”); Robert Barnes,
Supreme Court Strikes Down Restrictive Louisiana Abortion Law That Would Have Closed Clinics,
WASH. POST (June 29, 2020, 7:06 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/
supreme-court-louisiana-abortion-law-john-roberts/2020/06/29/6f42067e-ba00-11ea-8cf59c1b8d7f84c6_story.html [https://perma.cc/G967-3XQE] (asserting that Roberts’s vote in June
Medical Services “was perhaps the most dramatic example of Roberts’s new role as the pivotal
member of the court.”).
225. Justice John Roberts Joins the Supreme Court’s Liberal Wing in Some Key Rulings,
ECONOMIST (Jul. 2, 2020), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/07/02/justice-johnroberts-joins-the-supreme-courts-liberal-wing-in-some-key-rulings
[https://perma.cc/5YXPWCXY].
226. See cases cited supra notes 144, 146, 149 and accompanying text.
227. See supra Part III, Section A.
228. See Gely, supra note 123, at 107.
229. James C. Rehnquist, The Power That Shall be Vested in a Precedent, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345,
354–55 (1986).
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bias and political judgment. 230 When the Court consistently holds its prior
decisions as settled law, lower courts and litigants can function with an
understanding of just what the law is. 231 Stare decisis, therefore, provides
for consistency in the law and in the Court itself. 232 Such stability fosters
reliance on the Court’s decisions, 233 which also promotes greater
efficiency throughout the entire judicial system. 234 All of this presents the
decisions of the Court as the product of an impartial, apolitical
institution. 235
When the Court occasionally overturns precedent, with sufficient
reasoning to back it up, little is said of it. But when the Court strikes down
a prior rule in a high-profile, politically charged case, the result is likely
to draw attention and criticism directed at the Court. The Court is then
seen not as applying judicial discretion in reconsidering outmoded or
wrongly decided cases, but “participating in an unceremonious ‘heaveho’ of both the prior decisions and the previously applicable standards of

230. The link between the Court’s adherence to stare decisis and its reputation has been
promoted frequently in the general press. See, e.g., Litman & Davis, supra note 123, (“The doctrine
of stare decisis . . . helps preserve the court’s reputation as a nonpartisan—or at least not entirely
partisan—institution.”). See also Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 411, 463 (2010) (suggesting that the Court’s concern about its own reputation may
influence its likelihood or willingness to dispense with stare decisis, asserting that “the Court will be
extraordinarily reluctant to overrule its precedents based on concerns over perceived legitimacy”).
231. Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (explaining that stare decisis
is “of fundamental importance to the rule of law” because, among other things, it promotes
“predictability”).
232. See Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173,
1179 (2006) (“[O]nly by following the reasoning of previous decisions can the courts provide
guidance for the future, rather than a series of unconnected outcomes in particular cases.”).
233. Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202 (explaining how stare decisis establishes reliance on precedent,
such that in situations where both the legislature and individuals “have acted in reliance on a previous
decision . . . overruling the decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations”).
234. Nina Varsava, How to Realize the Value of Stare Decisis: Options for Following Precedent,
30 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 62, 68 (2018) (“The most prominent rationales for stare decisis [include] . . .
judicial efficiency.”).
235. Litman & Davis, supra note 123 (“The doctrine of stare decisis ensures stability in the law,
protects private parties who rely on the law and helps preserve the court’s reputation.” (emphasis
added)). See also Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of
Constitutional Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1534 (2008) (“[Stare decisis] is based not on the
assumption that prior judges are smarter than their successors but on the need for consistency,
efficiency, predictability, and the need not to overpoliticize the judicial process and thereby
undermine its credibility.” (emphasis added)).
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stare decisis.” 236 When this happens, scrutiny of those decisions, and the
Court in general, is likely to rise. 237
A public view of the Court as “overly partisan and result-driven”
leads to “gradual erosion and crumbling of its bedrock foundation [and]
the public’s perception of its legitimacy.” 238 Following precedent is one
way to avoid such arguments. 239 However, stare decisis can only go so
far. The Court’s reputation often hinges on what happens outside the
Court as much as inside.
To begin, whether people agree with the decisions in specific cases
often influences their opinions of the Court. 240 Some issues are
unavoidably controversial, leaving the Court in the position of deciding,
as Roberts himself described it, “whether the Democrats win or the
Republicans win.” 241 When the issue is itself politically divisive, the
outcome of the case will be politically charged, and the public will react
accordingly. Attitudes about the Court among those who agree with the
decision will be positive. Those who disagree with the decision will likely
have negative views of the Court. 242 In this way, politically charged issues
lead to division along partisan lines, both inside and outside the Court.
Inside the Court, observers have noted that the Court has divided five
to four along ideological lines on numerous occasions. 243 That the Court
appears to hand down so many split decisions is itself significant to the
236. Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the
Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 649 (1999).
237. See Kozel, supra note 229, at 463 (suggesting that “the country ordinarily tolerates the
Court’s occasional need to revisit precedents,” but that highly politicized cases are likely to garner
more attention).
238. Peter Irons, Has the Supreme Court Lost its Legitimacy?, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2019, 10:46
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/has-supreme-court-lost-its-legitimacy-ncna966211
[https://perma.cc/2JZ3-ULGP].
239. Id.
240. See Jeffery J. Mondak, Policy Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: The Sources and
Contexts of Legitimation, 47 POL. RES. Q. 675, 676 (1994) (explaining that one perspective on
Supreme Court legitimacy is based on public agreement, such that “legitimacy exists when the citizen
approves of” the policy behind the given Court decision).
241. As quoted in Greg Stohr, Political Cases Test Roberts’s Efforts to Keep the Supreme Court
(last
updated
June
28,
2019,
10:40
AM),
Above
It
All,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-28/political-cases-test-roberts-bid-to-keep-highcourt-above-it-all [https://perma.cc/UA4P-96CP].
242. See Grove, supra note 152, at 2252 (noting that some scholars have argued recently that
“members of the public tend to support the Court if it rules ‘their way’ in salient cases”); but see
James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court, 10 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 201, 209 (2014) (arguing that “institutional support for the U.S. Supreme Court is not
polarized along partisan and/or ideological lines,” but reflects fundamental values that lead to fairly
equal support for the Court between Democrats and Republicans).
243. Cass S. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 769, 770 (2015) (“On many of the great issues of the day, the Court has been divided 5–4.”).
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Court’s reputation, suggesting a general discord among the justices. 244
The impact is more profound when those decisions appear to run along
ideological lines, as was the case recently in Obergefell, Knick, and Janus.
Joan Biskupic describes this very scenario in her biography of Roberts,
The Chief, explaining that such cases as Citizens United in 2010, Shelby
County in 2013, and “a series of other 5–4 rulings . . . buttressed the
perception that the Court majority was politically motivated and that
Roberts was engaged in the partisanship he claimed to abhor.” 245 Roberts
himself has asserted that the Court’s legitimacy is “threatened by a steady
term after term after term focus on 5–4 decisions,” which the Court must
avoid, or it “[is] going to lose its credibility and legitimacy as an
institution.” 246
Outside the Court, when politicians criticize the decisions publicly,
they politicize those decisions and conflate the Court’s holding with the
policy arguments for or against the issue in question. 247 So much attention
on high profile and politically charged cases tends to blur the reality and
mislead the public. For example, the American people likely are not aware
of the fact that nearly 40% of the decisions in merits cases heard in the
Court’s 2018 term were unanimous, compared with under 30% decided
by a five-to-four split. 248
Consequently, the Court’s best course of action vis-à-vis its
reputation and legitimacy may be to do as Roberts suggested during his
confirmation hearings: to “decide every case based on the record,

244. Robert E. Riggs, When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the United States Supreme
Court, 1900–90, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 667–68 (1993) (“In the early decades of this century, when
5–4 decisions were few and unanimity was the rule, critics of the Court often suggested that decisions
by a single vote . . . were somehow illegitimate.”); Mondak, supra note 239, at 679 (“[A] 9–0 ruling
may achieve a higher level of legitimacy than a 5–4 ruling.”); Tomasky, supra note 35 (explaining
that “past chief justices worked to avoid 5–4 decisions on controversial matters [because] [t]hey
wanted Americans to see that the court was unified”).
245. BISKUPIC, supra note 37, at 9.
246. As quoted in Jeffrey Rosen, Are Liberals Trying to Intimidate John Roberts?, NEW
REPUBLIC (May 28, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/103656/obamacare-affordable-care-actcritics-response [https://perma.cc/43RA-2A5D]. See also Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, ATLANTIC
(Jan./Feb. 2007), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-rules/305559/
[https://perma.cc/D9V3-MUF9] (expressing Roberts’s view that “closely divided, 5–4 decisions
make it harder for the public to respect the Court as an impartial institution that transcends partisan
politics”).
247. See Hamilton, supra note 34, at 35–36. See also Grove, supra note 152, at 2272 (“The
partisan actions of the President and the Senate have damaged the Supreme Court’s public
reputation.”).
248. Final Stat Pack for October Term 2018, SCOTUSBLOG 5 (June 28, 2019, 5:59 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/StatPack_OT18-7_30_19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8DCK-UMDM].
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according to the rule of law, without fear or favor . . . .” 249 In fact,
throughout its history, the Court has overruled its prior decisions on more
than 200 occasions. 250 Many of these cases are now applauded as
examples of the Court getting it right. 251 For example, Brown v. Board of
Education (1954) 252 overturned Plessy v. Ferguson (1896); 253 Obergefell
v. Hodges (2015) 254 overturned Baker v. Nelson (1972); 255 West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish (1937) 256 overturned Lochner v. New York (1905); 257 and
Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967) 258 overturned Adler v. Board of
Education (1952). 259 Given the historical view, it can be argued that the
Court’s decisions in these cases ultimately strengthened, rather than
weakened, its institutional integrity, despite its disregard for stare
decisis. 260
C.

The result in Kisor was harmful to the Court’s reputation

The decision in Kisor has generally been viewed, as Corbin Barthold
and Cory Andrews described on SCOTUSblog shortly after Kisor came
down, as a “small win for James Kisor; a big loss for the Constitution.” 261

249. Roberts: ‘My Job is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat,’ CNN (Sept. 12,
2005,
4:58
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/
[https://perma.cc/JCS8-UUMZ] (opening statement of Judge John Roberts during his nomination
hearings before the Senate judiciary committee).
250. A.J. Willingham, The Supreme Court Has Overturned More Than 200 of Its Own
Decisions. Here’s What It Could Mean for Roe v. Wade, CNN (May 29, 2019, 7:31 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/29/politics/supreme-court-cases-overturned-history-constitutiontrnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/GSB4-C2U9].
251. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“[I]t is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”). But
see generally Thomas Jipping & Alexis Huggins, Yes, The Supreme Court Should Overturn Precedent
Sometimes, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/yes-thesupreme-court-should-overturn-precedent-sometimes [https://perma.cc/3RNM-SME9].
252. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
253. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
254. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
255. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
256. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
257. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
258. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
259. Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
260. See Jipping & Huggins, supra note 250 (“Following a past decision simply because it was
decided, rather than because it was decided correctly, would make it impossible to correct grievous
errors such as Dred Scott v. Sandford or Plessy v. Ferguson.”); Willingham, supra note 249
(explaining how many instances of the Court overturning precedent over the years “marked sea
changes in American society and rule of law,” including Brown and Obergefell).
261. Corbin Barthold & Cory Andrews, Symposium: A Small Win for James Kisor; a Big Loss
for the Constitution, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2019, 2:19 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
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As described above, deference to stare decisis alone does not ensure a net
gain for the Court’s institutional reputation. 262 Whether the Court had
overturned Auer or not, it was a clear, decisive, and unambiguous holding
in Kisor that would likely have provided a more lasting positive effect.
When commentators are questioning the Court’s logic on constitutional
grounds, as they have with Kisor, is there any doubt that the integrity of
the law, let alone the Court’s public image, is equally questioned? When
the Court hands down decisions in cases addressing politically charged
and polarizing issues, commentators, politicians, and the public at large
are likely to be more vocal in their support or criticism of the Court. 263
Strangely, while the Kisor result has drawn significant attention and
commentary, the reactions ran from “muted pessimism” to
“unenthusiastic optimism.” 264 Even the legal analysts do not seem to
know quite what to make of it.
Two issues are at the heart of the criticism of the Kisor result. First,
fundamentally, is whether Auer deference in any form represents a sound
legal doctrine. This issue will be addressed in the next section below.
Second, the Kisor Court did uphold Auer, 265 but in a “maimed and
enfeebled” form that leaves courts with less certainty as to when, whether,
and how to apply Auer deference in a given case, moving forward. 266
Trimming what was a broad, and broadly applied, legal principle may be
a good thing. 267 But as one observer put it, “the cure for Auer’s overreach
may turn out to be almost as bad as the disease.” 268 Alas, the Kisor
decision better illustrates the cobra effect than any legal principle—in this
case, where the efforts of the Chief Justice undermined his intentions.
In this case, the unintended consequences are far-reaching.
Following Kisor, courts and litigants have to deal with “needless and

2019/06/symposium-a-small-win-for-james-kisor-a-big-loss-for-the-constitution/
[https://perma.cc/J27U-U9Q3].
262. See supra Part IV, Section B (“But stare decisis can only go so far.”).
263. See Hamilton, supra note 34, at 35 (describing how highly publicized “above-the-fold”
decisions draw more attention on the Court, often with politicians promoting their views about the
results of those cases on political or ideological grounds and, ultimately, shaping public opinion).
264. Paul J. Larkin Jr., Baseball, Legal Doctrines, and Judicial Deference to an Agency’s
Interpretation of the Law: Kisor v. Wilkie, 2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 69, 74 (2019).
265. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019).
266. Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part). See also Schmitt, supra note 42 (explaining
that the decision in Kisor resulted in “all this indeterminacy”).
267. See Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole
Rock, 65 EMORY L. J. 47, 53 (2015) (describing how Seminole Rock deference, now referred to as
Auer deference, was originally constrained and narrowly applied, but evolved and broadened in scope,
and “courts began to apply the doctrine more widely in the 1960s and 1970s”).
268. Schmitt, supra note 42.
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perplexing new hoops” in applying Auer deference. 269 In the Kisor
opinion, the Court outlined multiple steps that courts must follow and
various factors they must consider to determine whether an agency’s
interpretation should control (that is, whether Auer deference applies) in
a given case. 270 First, the court must ensure that the regulation in question
is genuinely ambiguous. 271 To do this, the court “must exhaust all the
traditional tools of construction.” 272 If the language of the rule is indeed
deemed ambiguous, then the court must ensure that the agency’s
interpretation is “within the bounds of reasonable.” 273 If , after “‘carefully
consider[ing]’ [its] text, structure, history, and purpose,” 274 the court still
finds the regulation to be ambiguous, the court must then go on to “make
an independent inquiry” into the agency’s interpretation to determine
whether it has the proper “character and context” to warrant deference. 275
In other words, a court can only consider Auer if it is really sure the
regulation is ambiguous, and it should only then defer to the agency’s
interpretation if it is both “reasonable” and worthy of such deference.
But we are not done. To evaluate the worthiness of the agency’s
reading of the regulation, a court must consider several factors. 276 To
begin, the court must ensure that the interpretation was “actually made by
the agency,” by evaluating whether (a) the proper agency representatives
provided the interpretation and (b) did so in some official forum. 277 The
Court’s guidance to the lower courts here is that they ensure the agency’s
interpretation “emanate[d] from those actors, using those vehicles,
understood to make authoritative policy in the relevant context.” 278 Next,
the court must verify that the interpretation is the result of the agency’s
“substantive expertise.” 279 That means the subject of the interpretation
itself must be related to “the agency’s ordinary duties,” and not “within

269. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
270. Id. at 2415–18 (majority opinion).
271. Id. at 2415.
272. Id. (internal quotations removed) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
467 U.S. 837, 843, n.9).
273. Id. at 2416 (quoting Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013)).
274. Id. at 2415 (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991)).
275. Id. at 2416.
276. Id. (describing the various “important markers” a court must consider, “for identifying
when Auer deference is and is not appropriate”).
277. Id. (“[T]he regulatory interpretation must be one actually made by the agency. In other
words, it must be the agency’s ‘authoritative’ or ‘official position,’ rather than any m[e]re ad hoc
statement not reflecting the agency’s views.”).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 2417.
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the scope of another agency’s authority.” 280 Finally, the Court advises that
an agency’s interpretation “must reflect ‘fair and considered judgment’ to
receive Auer deference.” 281
With the Court’s direction in Kisor, lower courts attempting to apply
Auer deference now face many “new and nebulous qualifications and
limitations.” 282 As Justice Gorsuch lamented in his concurrence, “We owe
our colleagues on the lower courts more candid and useful guidance than
this.” 283 The decision also leaves the courts with a form of deference that
is, at best, weak 284 and perhaps nonexistent. 285 In fact, on three occasions
in the Kisor opinion, the Court reminded us that Auer “does not apply in
all cases.” 286 When a court determines that it does, the new Court-imposed
multi-step analysis leaves those courts susceptible to challenges on
numerous fronts. Was the regulation genuinely ambiguous? Was the
agency’s interpretation reasonable? Did the interpretation reflect the
substantive expertise of the agency? Did the agency arrive at its
interpretation following fair and considered judgment? The list goes on.
As such, lower courts may elect to simply avoid Auer deference entirely,
to sidestep the “indeterminacy” that Kisor now brings. 287
The resulting confusion among the lower courts, however they
respond, is a serious and legitimate concern that also does little to enhance
the Court’s reputation. Ironically, it was adherence to stare decisis that led
to this result. 288 In the Kisor opinion, Justice Kagan explained that for the
petitioner, Mr. Kisor, to prevail in overturning Auer deference, “he must
overcome stare decisis—that special care we take to preserve our
precedents.” 289 He failed to do so, Kagen asserted, because he “[did] not
offer the kind of special justification needed.” 290 Yet, the decision raised
doubts about whether such deference to stare decisis was genuine 291 or at
280. Id. at 2417 (internal editing and quotation marks omitted) (quoting City of Arlington, Tex.
v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 309 (2013)).
281. Id. (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012)).
282. Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
283. Id. at 2425.
284. Id. at 2426 (asserting that the ruling in Kisor “has transformed Auer into a paper tiger”).
285. In his concurring opinion in Kisor, Roberts asserted that the difference between the
majority’s modified form of Auer deference and Justice Gorsuch’s preference to do away with it
entirely, is “not as great as it may initially appear.” Id. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J, concurring in part).
286. Id. at 2414 (majority opinion) (quoting Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155).
287. Schmitt, supra note 42.
288. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422 (“[S]tare decisis cuts strongly against [overturning Auer.]”).
289. Id. at 2418.
290. Id.
291. In fairness, both liberals and conservatives have shown a relationship to stare decisis that
may be best described as opportunistic. See, e.g., Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and
Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 402 (1988) (describing stare
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least whether it was proper here.292 Either way, the Kisor result leaves
several losers in its wake. First, lower courts will find that applying Auer
deference in future cases is a significant challenge. Second, administrative
agencies will now lack confidence that their interpretations will have
controlling weight. Third, litigants will be unsure of what principle of
deference, if any, applies in regulatory interpretation cases. Finally, the
High Court is left with a record of having just “zombified” a legal
doctrine. 293 As Justice Gorsuch complained in his concurring opinion,
“we’re stuck with it because of the respect due precedent.”294
D.

The Court should overturn Auer once and for all

Evidence of the cobra effect is apparent in the Kisor decision. By
compromising and deferring to stare decisis to avoid further damage to
the Court’s reputation, Roberts’s efforts in Kisor appear to have done
more harm than good. There are certainly numerous reasons why Auer
deference should be shelved as a legal doctrine. But it is the fact that
separation of powers is at stake that is most salient to the question of the
Court’s institutional integrity. By allowing the agencies which
promulgated ambiguous rules to provide interpretations of those rules,
courts necessarily delegate their role of providing legal construction. In
doing so, the courts allow an administrative agency to do that which Chief
Justice Marshall famously asserted was the sole province of the courts:
“to say what the law is.” 295
That the Court should overturn Auer is best understood in light of the
arguments in support of Auer deference. These arguments arise out of the
rationale the Court has provided over the years when deferring to agency
interpretations, and outlined by Justice Kagan in the Kisor opinion. First,
“the agency that promulgated a rule is in the ‘better position [to]
reconstruct’ its original meaning,” 296 simply because it understands the

decisis as “a doctrine of convenience, to both conservatives and liberals,” proponents of which are
“determined by the needs of the moment,” and explaining that those who seek to overturn a
longstanding law today are often most urgently supporting stare decisis when the new law is later at
risk of being overturned).
292. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2443–44 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (asserting that the majority
was “pretending to bow to stare decisis,” and arguing that “[t]here are serious questions about whether
stare decisis should apply here at all”).
293. Id. at 2425.
294. Id. at 2443.
295. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
296. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412 (quoting Martin v. O.S.H. Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 152
(1991)).
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subject matter and the intentions of Congress better than the courts do. 297
Second, as the Court explained in Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., the
need for “judgment grounded in policy concerns” in interpreting
regulations makes it appropriate to allow the agency “to make such policy
determinations,” rather than leaving such policy-related questions in the
hands of the courts. 298 Finally, as the Court in Kisor explained, “Auer
deference [is] rooted in a presumption . . . that Congress would generally
want the agency to play the primary role in resolving regulatory
ambiguities.” 299
What the Court left behind following Kisor is a weakened form of
Auer deference, which retains many of its drawbacks, while the few
benefits are diluted. To begin, the Court weakened one notable feature of
Auer deference: its power to bind the courts. 300 Following Kisor, courts
are only to consider applying Auer deference after determining they
cannot crack the mystery of the rule in question, using “all the traditional
tools of construction.” 301 Before Kisor, in cases of agency rule
interpretation, application of Auer deference went something like this: if
the rule language was not “free from doubt,” 302 then the interpretation
provided by the agency that promulgated the rule was controlling. 303 Thus,
the first question before the courts was often not whether the statute was
“genuinely ambiguous,” but whether the agency’s interpretation was
“plainly erroneous.” 304 And the answer to that question addressed not
whether deference to that interpretation was due, as that was effectively a
forgone conclusion, but whether that interpretation would bind the
297. See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 629 (1991) (describing the
“significant expertise” needed to understand and properly interpret what may be a “complex and
highly technical regulatory program”).
298. Id. at 697. See also Martin 499 U.S. at 153 (“[H]istorical familiarity and policymaking
expertise account . . . for the presumption that Congress delegates interpretive lawmaking power to
the agency rather than to the reviewing court.”).
299. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412.
300. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (explaining that where a term is “a creature of
the [agency’s] own regulations,” the agency’s “interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence,
controlling . . .”). See also Hessick, supra note 46, at 422 (explaining that, along with Chevron, Auer
is one of “two doctrines of binding deference,” and explaining further that, under Auer, where a “court
concludes that [a] regulation is ambiguous, the court will treat the agency’s interpretation as
binding—so long as the agency’s interpretation of the regulation is reasonable”).
301. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837, 843, n.9).
302. Martin, 499 U.S. at 150.
303. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. See also Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971) (“[When]
the meaning of the language is not free from doubt, we are obligated to regard as controlling a
reasonable, consistently applied administrative interpretation if the Government’s be such.”
(emphasis added)).
304. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412.
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court. 305 In that instance, as explained in Auer, the agency’s interpretation
was “controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.” 306 With Kisor, the Court changed the nature of Auer
deference as a result of the many qualifications now required to show that
the agency’s interpretation is worthy of consideration. 307
Even with such qualifications, the constitutional concerns about Auer
remain. At the heart of the constitutional arguments against agency
deference is the fact that it represents the courts delegating their
interpretive, and thus judicial, authority. 308 Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States exclusively in
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.309 Alexander Hamilton, in
Federalist Number 78, further established in 1788 that “[t]he
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts,” and “[i]t therefore belongs to them to ascertain . . . the meaning
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.” 310
The constitutional concerns about Auer deference have been
expressed by many of the Supreme Court Justices themselves. Justice
Thomas shared Hamilton’s view. In his concurring opinion for Perez v.
Mortgage Bankers Association, he argued that Auer “represents a transfer
of judicial power to the Executive Branch, and it amounts to an erosion of
the judicial obligation to serve as a ‘check’ on the political branches.” 311
Roberts, in his concurring opinion in Kisor, drew a distinction between
Auer and Skidmore. “There is a difference between holding that a court
ought to be persuaded by an agency’s interpretation [as with Skidmore
305. Even in Auer itself, the Court made no reference to the challenges in interpretation of the
regulatory language (whether public-sector employees are “subject to” overtime pay requirements
under the Fair Labor Standards Act), but simply held that “we must sustain the Secretary’s approach
so long as it is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 457. In
determining that the “deferential standard is easily met here,” the Court then demonstrated how the
Secretary’s interpretation of “subject to” was reasonable because it was consistent with the dictionary
definition. Id. at 461.
306. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
307. The various “qualifications” are described above, supra Part IV, Section C. But even before
Kisor, lower courts had been attaching exceptions and qualifications to Auer, such that it was evolving
in practice. See Kristin E. Hickman & Mark R. Thomson, The Chevronization of Auer, 103 MINN. L.
REV. HEADNOTES 103, 110, 112 (2019) (“Exceptions and caveats . . . have profoundly transformed
Auer deference” to the point that “[p]erhaps the benefits of applying Auer just aren’t worth the
trouble.”).
308. Hessick, supra note 46, at 426 (“The constitutional argument [against Auer deference]
turns on Article III [of the U.S. Constitution], which provides that the judicial power shall be vested
in the federal courts.” (internal edits and punctuation omitted)).
309. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
310. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 485–86 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888).
311. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 119 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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deference],” he wrote, “and holding that it should defer to that
interpretation under certain conditions [as required under Auer].” 312 Once
a judge reasonably determines that Auer deference applies to a given case,
the judge is necessarily relinquishing his interpretive authority to the
regulatory agency. 313 By contrast, under Skidmore deference, where the
agency’s interpretation is persuasive, but not controlling, 314 the court
determines how much weight, if any, to give to an agency’s interpretation
of statutory or regulatory language. All of the justifications for Auer
deference, emphasizing the value of the agency’s technical expertise and
policy-oriented considerations, seem to ignore the fact that “every day, in
courts throughout this country, judges manage with these traditional tools
[of interpretation] to reach conclusions about the meaning of statutes,
rules of procedure, contracts, and the Constitution.” 315
There are two other arguments in support of overturning Auer that
are relevant here. First, the doctrine of Auer deference is inconsistent with
the Administrative Procedure Act (thus contradicting Congress’s view
that courts are “to ‘determine the meaning’ of any relevant ‘agency
action,’ including any rule issued by the agency”). 316 Second, deferring to
an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous rules creates an incentive for
agencies to construct ambiguous regulations. 317 Both of these arguments
serve to emphasize further the disparity between Auer deference and the
judicial role of the courts. By overturning Auer, the Court would have left
the lower courts the form of deference prescribed in Skidmore. Courts
could then refer to the agency as one source—perhaps the primary source,
but merely a persuasive one—for its own interpretation of regulations,
without the risks associated with Auer deference described here. 318
The fact that Auer deference is inconsistent with the Administrative
Procedure Act is another way of framing the Constitutional questions

312. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2424 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) (emphasis
added).
313. Id. at 2429 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (“Under Auer, judges are forced to subordinate
their own views about what the law means to those of a political actor . . . .”).
314. Skidmore deference is described above, supra Part II, Section A.1.
315. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2430 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
316. Id. at 2432, 2434 (quoting from 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) to explain that “Auer is . . .
incompatible with the APA’s instructions”).
317. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J. concurring)
(“[D]eferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules
which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases.”).
318. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2447 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (“Overruling Auer would have
taken us directly back to Skidmore, liberating courts to decide cases based on their independent
judgment and follow the agency’s view only to the extent it is persuasive.” (internal edits and
punctuation omitted)).
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raised above. This may also be the most crucial argument for overturning
Auer when the Court’s reputation is of primary concern. Allowing
executive branch agencies to both write the rules and interpret them,
establishing controlling legal authority in the process, violates the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. 319 Combined with the fact
that such deference denies the courts of their interpretive role, upholding
Auer only serves to weaken the judiciary and, with it, the Court’s
institutional integrity. 320
All of this explains why the decision in Kisor is a case study of the
cobra effect at work on the High Court, showcasing how the Chief
Justice’s efforts were self-defeating. As a means of strengthening the
Court’s institutional integrity, Roberts supported upholding a
constitutionally questionable legal doctrine that usurps power from the
judiciary in a form that places a significant burden on lower courts that
attempt to apply it. Any stabilizing effects of abiding by stare decisis were
more than offset by the destabilizing effects of the Kisor decision.
Overturning Auer is the only appropriate next step for the Court. The
question remaining is simply when that opportunity will again arise, and
whether the Court will then have the courage to do it. 321
V. CONCLUSION
The unexpected and confounding decision in Kisor produced several
unintended consequences. The form of Auer deference left in its wake is
narrower and, as such, more akin to Skidmore deference. 322 This only begs
the question as to why the Court did not simply do away with Auer entirely
since the principle of Skidmore deference is already available to the
courts. Additionally, the willingness and ability of courts to apply Auer
are now in doubt given Kisor’s “splintered opinions and multi-factored
tests.” 323 Even knowing whether it is appropriate to apply Auer at all is

319. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 696 (1996) (“[A]t the end of the day [Auer
deference] leaves only one actor—the agency—to write the relevant regulatory law and then to ‘say
what the law is.’ This arrangement contradicts a central and strictly enforced commitment of the
separation of powers . . . .”).
320. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2447 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (“[T]he majority’s attempt to
remodel Auer’s rule into a multi-step, multi-factor inquiry guarantees more uncertainty and much
litigation.”).
321. Id. at 2426 (“The Court’s failure to be done with Auer . . . all but guarantees we will have
to pass this way again. When that day comes, I hope this Court will find the nerve it lacks today and
inter Auer at last.”).
322. Schmitt, supra note 42.
323. Schmitt, supra note 42.
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sure to leave lower courts confused. 324 Of course, the true unintended
consequence of Kisor arises because of the impact it will have on the
lower courts, combined with the disregard for separation of powers it
allows. In the long run, Kisor’s legacy will likely be that it undermined
the Court’s legitimacy.
All is not lost. In their separate concurring opinions in Kisor, Roberts
and Kavanaugh both leave open the possibility that the Court may one day
reconsider Chevron deference. 325 In truth, even Auer is still not entirely
off the chopping block. As Justice Gorsuch prophesied in his separate
Kisor opinion, “This case hardly promises to be this Court’s last word on
Auer.” 326 Perhaps the Court will one day call the cobras back.

324. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2430 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (describing Auer deference,
following Kisor, as “a doctrine of uncertain scope and application” (quoting Hickman & Thomson,
supra note 306 at 105)).
325. Id. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) (explaining that issues surrounding Auer
deference are distinct from those surrounding Chevron deference, and that “I do not regard the Court’s
decision today to touch upon the latter question”); Id. at 2449 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part)
(explaining that “like the Chief Justice, I do not regard the Court’s decision not to formally overrule
Auer” to preclude reconsideration of Chevron deference (internal quotation marks omitted)).
326. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
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